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INTRODUCTION
A core failing of today’s administrative state and modern administrative law
scholarship is the lack of imagination as to how agencies should operate. On the
conventional telling, public agencies follow specific grants of regulatory
authority, use the traditional tools of notice-and-comment rulemaking and
adjudication, and are checked by judicial review. In reality, however, effective
administration depends on entrepreneurial leadership that can spearhead policy
experimentation and trial-and-error problem-solving, including the development
of regulatory programs that use non-traditional tools.
Entrepreneurial administration takes place both at public agencies and private
entities, each of which can address regulatory challenges and earn regulatory
authority as a result. Consider, for example, that Energy Star, a successful
program that has encouraged the manufacture and sale of energy efficient
appliances, is developed and overseen by the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”).1 After the EPA established the program, Congress codified it and,
eventually, other countries followed suit.2 By contrast, the successful and
complementary program encouraging the construction of energy efficient
buildings, the well-respected Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(“LEED”) standard, was developed and is overseen by a private organization.3
After it was developed, a number of governmental authorities endorsed it and

1

Energy Star, Origins & Missions, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm
?c=about.ab_index%20 [https://perma.cc/WJF7-ALKG] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
2 The EPA developed the program without any specific congressional mandate to do so;
in creating the program, it invoked a broad exhortation from the Clean Act Amendments of
1990. Id. (“Section 103(g) of the Clean Air Act directs the Administrator to ‘conduct a basic
engineering research and technology program to develop, evaluate, and demonstrate non–
regulatory strategies and technologies for reducing air pollution.’”). Although the EPA
initially developed this program, it later enlisted the Department of Energy (“DOE”) as a
partner to administer the program. Id. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress codified
the program. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2012) (establishing
Energy Star as “a voluntary program to identify and promote energy-efficient products and
buildings . . . .”).
3 See Join Our Community, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://new.usgbc.org/join
[https://perma.cc/9MAJ-G48P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
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have encouraged LEED-certified construction projects with both carrots4 and
sticks.5 Significantly, although neither the Energy Star program nor the LEED
standard were originally anticipated by any regulatory statute, both have had
tremendous impacts.
The Energy Star and LEED case studies exemplify the sort of innovative
regulatory strategies taking root in the modern administrative state.6 Despite the
importance of entrepreneurial administration in practice, scholars have failed to
examine the role of entrepreneurial leadership in spurring policy innovation and
earning regulatory authority for an agency (or private entity).7 This oversight is
most unfortunate in the case of technologically developing fields where
experimental regulatory strategies—as opposed to traditional notice-andcomment rulemaking or adjudication—are often essential.8 In short,
administrative law needs an account of agency action that explains why
entrepreneurial leadership matters in government and how agencies should
operate.9
4 See, e.g., Good to Know: Green Building Incentive Strategies, U.S. GREEN BLDG.
COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/articles/good-know-green-building-incentive-strategies-0
[https://perma.cc/R59U-CTPE] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
5 See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
6 In viewing programs like Energy Star as a form of “regulation,” I am using the term in
its broader sense. See CARY COGLIANESE, THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION AND
REGULATORY POLICY 9 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1_coglianese%
20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/T54V-M28D] (“[R]egulation seeks to change behaviour in order
to produce desired outcomes.”).
7 Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 903 (2009)
(“Given legal scholars’ long-standing interest in and sensitivity to institutions, it is ironic that
this set of questions about institutions is only now starting to penetrate the thinking of those
of us in law who study agencies and their operation.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1518-19 (2015) (noting administrative law’s disconnect from actual
government practices); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden
Side of Administrative Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (calling for more careful
scrutiny as to how agencies operate in practice).
8 Some scholars have noted the limits of notice-and-comment rulemaking and
adjudication. E.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1490 (2005) (“[N]otice-and-comment rulemaking is
ossifying, and formal adjudication is burdensome.”). Similarly, a number of scholars have
noted the rise of alternative models of regulation to adapt to accelerating technological change
and globalization. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self-Governance Through Global
Product Certification Programs, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS? SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 261, 261 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd
Winter eds., 2007); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448 (2003).
9 For one recent alternative account, see Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians
and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L.
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This Article explains that the conventional view of agency behavior—
following the specific direction of Congress or the President and using noticeand-comment rulemaking or adjudication processes—does not capture how
public agencies and private entities develop innovative regulatory strategies and
earn regulatory authority as a result. In particular, this Article explains how
governmental agencies like the EPA and private entities like the United States
Green Building Council (“USGBC”) (which oversees the LEED standard)
depend on entrepreneurial leadership to develop experimental regulatory
strategies. It also explains how, in the wake of such experiments, legislative
bodies have the opportunity to evaluate regulatory innovations in practice before
deciding whether to embrace, revise, reject, or merely tolerate them. To be sure,
such experimental strategies are not always preferable to traditional
administrative rulemaking and adjudication, but considering experimental
strategies and evaluating whether they would be more effective than traditional
regulatory approaches is.
Legal scholarship on experimental regulation is well-developed in the context
of states serving as laboratories of democracy.10 Scholars have not, however,
discussed the significant role that federal agencies and private bodies can play
in experimenting with regulatory strategies in advance of congressional action.11
Scholars have also failed to examine the role of entrepreneurial leadership in
developing successful experiments. This Article does just that, highlighting the
importance of entrepreneurial leadership in government, discussing a number of

REV. 227, 232-34, 243, 266 (2016) (challenging conventional narrative and explaining
interactive dynamic of how agencies, the President, Congress, and civil society check one
another’s authority and collaborate with one another).
10 The phrase, of course, comes from Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”). For a discussion of the use of state agencies to experiment within federal
regulatory regimes, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-73 (2001). Indeed, as Robert Ahdieh
points out, a core value of “intersystem[] regulation” (which can include international entities)
is the encouragement of regulatory innovation. Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38
CONN. L. REV. 863, 892 (2006).
11 To be sure, some commentators have called for changes to the administrative state to
allow for experimental regulations. E.g., Sofia Ranchordas, Innovation Experimentalism in
the Age of the Sharing Economy, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 871, 875 (2015) (proposing new
model for experimental regulations); Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69
VAND. L. REV. 401, 430 (2016) (calling for new approach to enabling experiments using
traditional administrative law tools); see also Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive
Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 182 (2014) (suggesting how timing rules and
alternative enforcement mechanisms can be used to manage experimental regulatory
strategies).
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emerging regulatory experiments, and suggesting how Congress should evaluate
such experiments.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the traditional model of
regulation and the emerging alternative models of agency action through coregulation, developing best practices through convening, and encouraging
private regulation. In so doing, it underscores that entrepreneurial leadership and
a culture of experimentation and trial-and-error learning is essential to
developing the best solution. Part II discusses the relevant criteria for evaluating
such experiments and examines potential objections to the earned regulatory
authority model. Part III discusses four case studies of experimental regulatory
strategies: (1) the USGBC’s development of the LEED standard; (2) the Federal
Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) oversight of information privacy and data security
practices; (3) the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”)
development of a strategy for cybersecurity readiness; and (4) the Department
of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) oversight of electronic health records.
In all of these cases, the private body or federal agency acted to oversee an
emerging technology or issue (often in advance of explicit congressional
direction and guidance), allowing Congress to observe the strategy in action and
evaluate it after the fact. Part IV examines the concept of policy
entrepreneurship, explaining both the barriers and opportunities it faces in the
modern administrative state.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND EMERGING REALITIES

The traditional model of regulation relies on notice-and-comment rulemaking
and agency adjudication.12 Under this model, the output—the starting point for
traditional administrative law analysis—is generally a form of positive law
developed and enforced by a government agency through traditional tools
(rulemaking or adjudication).13 As Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon
have observed, this model, “pejoratively called command and control, is
identified with rule-bound bureaucracy and deference to ineffable expertise.”14
The traditional model can be depicted neatly as a hierarchy.15 Congress sets a
specific policy direction and empowers an administrative agency to implement
that policy. The agency, in turn, uses either its rulemaking or adjudication
authority to implement that direction. Finally, owing to the agency’s expertise
and congressional authorization, courts review the agency’s action with
deference.

12

See Jason Solomon, Book Review Essay, Law and Governance in the 21st Century
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 821-22 (2008).
13 See id.
14 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011).
15 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 12, at 820.
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Driven by technological changes and globalization, regulatory agencies
increasingly are looking to alternative regulatory strategies, many of which fit
under the “[N]ew [G]overnance” label.16 In some cases, innovative regulators
experiment with new approaches to address emerging issues and fill gaps in the
existing regulatory regime. In other cases, an agency might experiment with a
co-regulatory strategy (where the agency integrates its authority with private
sector efforts); exercise its authority in creative ways, such as developing best
practices through convenings; or rely on private regulation. In that last category,
as is the case with Energy Star, the government agency (or private entity, for
that matter) can certify compliance with best practices, thereby sharing valuable
information with the public and shaping norms of behavior.17 In each of the
above examples, the regulatory agency acts not within a hierarchy, but within a
network.18

16 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (2004) (“New
Governance is not a single model, but a loosely related family of alternative approaches to
governance, each advanced as a corrective to the perceived pathologies of conventional forms
of regulation.”); Solomon, supra note 12, at 823 (categorizing New Governance strategies as
ones where “public and private actors interact in increasingly complex and collaborative ways
to address problems of public policy”); see also Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin,
Experimental Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169, 169 (David
Levi-Faur ed., 2012) (“[E]xperimentalist governance is a recursive process of provisional
goal-setting and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches to
advancing them in different contexts.”). Both New Governance and experimental governance
follow in the intellectual tradition of Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s landmark
work in the field. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (“[B]y
working more creatively with the interplay between private and public regulation, government
and citizens can design better policy solutions.”).
17 Professor Michael Livermore, invoking the Energy Star model, calls the combination of
information sharing and norm entrepreneurship “preference-directed regulation.” Michael A.
Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation and
Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 326-32 (2007) (describing way that
information provided and norms established by EPA’s Energy Star program have altered
consumer preferences).
18 Sabel & Zeitlin use the concept of “network governance” to describe an experimentalist
approach, explaining that it captures the approach of a “reciprocal redefinition of ends and
means through an iterated, multi-level cycle of provisional goal-setting and revision.” Sabel
& Zeitlin, supra note 16, at 175. In a different piece with Simon, Sabel suggested that this
model of governance is “‘networked’ and ‘multilevel,’” explaining that it uses
“decisionmaking processes that are neither hierarchical nor closed and that permit persons of
different ranks, units, and even organizations to collaborate as circumstances demand.”
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004).
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The traditional, hierarchical model follows a familiar, step-wise approach to
regulation.19 The first step is establishing a standard of conduct.20 The second
step is implementing that standard of conduct, generally through a monitoring
regime.21 The final step is enforcement, in which parties are sanctioned for any
failures to comply with the rules.22 This model of regulatory action still holds
strong in some areas, but it is no longer—and should not be—the exclusive
strategy for addressing emerging policy issues.
In the emerging, networked environment, regulatory agencies find themselves
with a range of options and tools for developing standards of conduct,
monitoring behavior in the marketplace, and enforcing or encouraging
compliance. The conversation around such emerging solutions has taken a
number of forms, sometimes under the headings of “responsive regulation,”
“experimentalism,” or “New Governance.” However framed, there is a pressing
need for more adaptable approaches that can operate effectively in
technologically changing environments or in fields where the circumstances
differ across geographic (or other) contexts.23 To address emerging challenges,
regulatory agencies will increasingly be called upon to experiment with nontraditional regulatory strategies, requiring legislatures to monitor and evaluate
the effectiveness of innovative regulatory initiatives after the fact.
A.

The Limits of the Traditional Regulatory Approach

The traditional model of regulation is coming under strain in the face of
increasing globalization and technological change.24 Consider, for example, the
traditional model of drug and medical device approval used by the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”). The legacy model of regulation envisioned the
FDA reviewing a drug and making an up-or-down decision on whether to
approve the marketing of the drug.25 By putting all of the pressure on the front

19

For a discussion of these steps, see Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private
Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 299-300 (2014) (explaining that there are
three aspects of regulation: rule creation, rule implementation, and enforcement).
20 See id. at 299.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23
See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559, 600 (2014)
(“[T]he conventional regulatory state is not designed for agencies to move quickly and
adaptively.”).
24 FTC Chairwoman Maureen Ohlhausen made the point colorfully, stating that, for
rapidly evolving, unregulated industries, “yesterday’s comfortable regulatory bed can quickly
become a torture rack for tomorrow’s technologies.” Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Procrustean
Problem with Prescriptive Regulation, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 2 (2014); see also
Roger G. Noll, Impediments to Innovation in Legal Infrastructure, 8 I/S 62, 62 (2012)
(“[A]ccelerated technological progress and globalization of economic relationships have
made standard-form solutions to legal problems increasingly inefficient . . . .”).
25 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 14, at 86.
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end (ex ante), the legacy model creates two sets of challenges: (1) the preapproval process takes a long time, costs a lot of money, and, in some cases,
unnecessarily delays access to potentially beneficial drugs; and (2) the lack of a
post-approval review process allows drugs to “be marketed despite evidence that
they were doing unanticipated harm.”26 Unfortunately, the second type of
error—a lack of responsiveness to on-the-ground realities—reinforces the first
type of error, creating more pressure on the FDA to withhold approval until it
satisfies itself that the relevant drug or device will not cause harm.27
Congress is well aware of the limits of traditional ex ante regulation. In the
food and drug arena, it has worked to update the FDA’s model of regulation. In
the Food and Drug Administration Amendments of 2007, for example, Congress
gave the FDA increased flexibility to approve drugs and require ongoing
research as to how the drugs work, called for an improved Adverse Event Report
System at the agency, and mandated a framework for monitoring drug efficacy
in practice.28 More recently, the FDA established fast-tracks for approving drugs
and medical devices that promise life-saving breakthroughs.29 As the FDA
explained with respect to the medical device review process, “[r]educing
premarket data requirements while increasing postmarket requirements for
devices subject to a [Pre-Market Approval], when appropriate, can assist the
FDA in making medical devices available to patients sooner than if following
the traditional premarket review pathway.”30

26

Id.
For another example of the limits of the traditional model and its principal focus on ex
ante regulation, consider the case of wireless spectrum regulation. See, e.g., J. PIERRE DE VRIES
& PHILIP J. WEISER, UNLOCKING SPECTRUM VALUE THROUGH IMPROVED ALLOCATION,
ASSIGNMENT,
AND
ADJUDICATION
OF
SPECTRUM
RIGHTS
5-6
(2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_DeVriesWeiserDiscPaper.pd
f [https://perma.cc/SY49-4MGA] (advocating for implementation of specific reforms in
spectrum regulation to reduce time-consuming regulatory processes); Philip J. Weiser & Dale
Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2008) (arguing that, by continuing to use “command and control” model
of spectrum regulation, FCC has ignored need for regulatory reform).
28 Sabel & Simon, supra note 14, at 87. In so doing, Congress opted to adhere to the
traditional model, rather than take a fundamental reform along the lines urged by Richard
Epstein. See Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should
Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009) (advocating model where
FDA acted only to certify drugs as safe, allowing for more experimentation in market with
novel cures).
29 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXPEDITED ACCESS FOR PREMARKET APPROVAL AND DE
NOVO MEDICAL DEVICES INTENDED FOR UNMET MEDICAL NEED FOR LIFE THREATENING OR
IRREVERSIBLY DEBILITATING DISEASES OR CONDITIONS 4 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/ucm/
groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddev-gen/documents/document/ucm393978.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A87Z-CV3D].
30 Id. at 5.
27
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This Article, while sympathetic to the need to reform existing regulatory
structures, does not focus on this issue.31 Rather, it explains how considerable
flexibility for a range of alternative options exists within current structures and
is already being used by agencies and private entities to great effect. As such,
this Article describes the underappreciated model of earned regulatory authority,
calls for a more self-conscious use of this model, and explains how agencies can
spearhead and implement this model successfully through entrepreneurial
leadership and a culture of trial-and-error problem solving.32
The role of a more imaginative approach to regulation relates back to the
“responsive regulation” movement led by Ayres and Braithwaite. On their
account, regulatory strategies can be conceptualized as an “enforcement
pyramid,” with “persuasion” on the bottom and “license revocation” at the top
(as the regulatory equivalent of the death penalty for a regulated firm).33 In all
cases, a responsive regulation approach emphasizes dialogue and engagement
around the impact of regulatory efforts in practice.34 In so doing, it underscores
that regulators need not always use their traditional tools (notice-and-comment
rulemaking and adjudication). Rather than reflexively adopting traditional
approaches, regulatory agencies can (1) embrace and oversee self-regulation
(enforced self-regulation or co-regulation), (2) convene stakeholders to develop
best practices, or (3) persuade parties to develop private regulatory initiatives.
The next three Sections discuss each strategy in turn.

31 For one thoughtful such discussion, see J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive
Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. SCI. & TECH. 21, 25 (2005) (“There is almost
universal agreement that problems of this sort demand new approaches to regulation.”). See
also Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (proposing changes to traditional structure of
administrative law to allow for agencies to use adaptive management model); David Zaring,
Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 193 (2010) (explaining how Treasury
Department operates free of traditional administrative law constraints in practice, enabling it
to use its authority more nimbly and flexibly than other agencies).
32 In the European Union, for example, there is an effort underway to promote
experimental strategies of governance. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 36 (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/docs/
comm_rapport_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KLM-FAA4].
33 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 16, at 35. Later, Braithwaite developed the
complementary concept of the “strengths-based pyramid” ranging from providing education
and persuasion around a valued concept to a singular award for excellent achievement, with
certification for best practice somewhere in the middle. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL.,
REGULATING AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND THE NEW PYRAMID 319 (2007). For an overall
discussion of Braithwaite’s thinking, see generally John Braithwaite, Fasken Lecture, The
Essence of Responsive Regulation, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 475 (2011).
34 See Braithwaite, supra note 33, at 476.
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The Promise of Co-Regulation

Even when using its traditional authority, an agency can operate more nimbly
and effectively by integrating its efforts with private bodies who have expertise
in the field. Where that integration involves the explicit embrace, oversight, and
enforcement of actions by private bodies, the model of regulation is aptly
described as “co-regulation.”35 For a successful use of co-regulation, consider
the FCC’s use of frequency coordinators to assign rights to use the wireless
spectrum. As I have explained previously:
One notable self-regulatory program that the FCC has overseen is the use
of frequency coordinators, which manage voluntary cooperation in the use
of point-to-point microwave links and private land mobile radio systems.
In that context, the coordinator evaluates requests for new licenses and
certifies that such new licenses will not cause undue interference to
established users. Consequently, while the FCC is the authority that grants
or denies licenses as a formal matter, it routinely relies on and defers to the
judgment of the frequency coordinator. This deference to the frequency
coordinator facilitates cooperation around the use of the relevant licenses.36
The importance of this co-regulation model is that the FCC’s delegation of
authority enables practical problem-solving on the ground by the frequency
coordinator. As Dale Hatfield, a former Chief Engineer at the FCC, explained,
this system works because it encourages the local engineers to “sit down
together, solve these problems, and say let’s figure out how to do it,” limiting
the need for the FCC to use its backstop authority.37
The FTC’s partnership with the Better Business Bureau’s National
Advertising Division (“NAD”) operates in a functionally similar fashion to the
FCC’s use of frequency coordinators.38 Notably, the NAD has developed an

35

For discussions about co-regulation, see Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet
Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 553 (2009) (“[T]he concept of co-regulation involves
industry self-policing through an independent and credible body subject to government
accountability and oversight.”); OFFICE OF COMMC’N, IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE
REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYSING SELF- AND CO-REGULATION 4 (2008)
(U.K.), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/coregulation/statement/state
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VVZ-9W5H] (summarizing Office of Communication’s method
for determining whether co-regulation is appropriate to achieve specific regulatory
objectives).
36 Weiser, supra note 35, at 555-56.
37 Id. at 555.
38 Formally, the FTC does not empower the NAD in the identical fashion as the FCC does
for frequency coordinators in that it does not specifically call for participation in this body
before bringing a matter to the FTC. As a practical matter, however, the FTC encourages the
use of the NAD. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Self-Regulation and Antitrust, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Feb. 18, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/02/self-regulationand-antitrust [https://perma.cc/FKC7-237M] (praising NAD as effective model of selfregulation).
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effective model of dispute resolution around misleading advertising issues,
deciding an array of issues and referring cases, where necessary and appropriate,
to the FTC.39 Because the NAD has developed such a trusted program, FTC
leaders have praised its work and relied on it to carry the laboring oar in this
area,40 leaving the FTC’s residual authority as a backstop. In particular, the NAD
refers cases to the FTC where a party refuses to participate in its process or
comply with a decision.41
Learning from the NAD model, the European Union is working with the
European Advertising Standards Alliance to develop a similar approach to
overseeing false advertising claims.42 In this case, however, the governmental
authority is actively involved in developing and supporting this body rather than
integrating its work after the body developed on its own.43 In short, government
can either embrace existing bodies as part of a co-regulation strategy or stimulate
and steer the development of new ones.
C.

The Role of Best Practices and Agency Convened Efforts

For many regulatory agencies, the opportunity to act as a “convenor,” to
develop best practices, and to create “soft law” or norms is an important part of
their mission. As former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic explained with regard to the
FTC, “Congress gave the FTC capacity to serve as a convenor—to engage in a
diverse array of activities that facilitate norms development,” including “what
we now call ‘soft law’ measures (e.g., self-regulatory standards, proposed
guidelines).”44 In particular, Congress specifically authorized the FTC to collect
information and develop reports on topics not immediately related to cases or
regulatory matters before the Commission.45 In Kovacic’s view, the FTC has
used its convening authority effectively, “improv[ing] understanding, build[ing]
consensus, and supply[ing] focal points for norms development” through
thoughtful reports that distill key issues.46

39

Weiser, supra note 35, at 553.
John E. Villafranco & Katherine E. Riley, So You Want to Self-Regulate? The National
Advertising Division as Standard Bearer, 27 ANTITRUST 79, 79 (2013).
41 Id.
42 Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Linda Senden, The Conceptual and Constitutional
Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 8-9 (2011).
43 See id.
44 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as Convenor: Developing
Regulatory Policy Norms Without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17, 19-20
(2015).
45 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (2012); see Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful
Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 176 (2005) (“A farsighted feature of Congress’s
institutional design is that it gave the FTC flexible tools to perform the necessary research and
development.”).
46 Kovacic, supra note 44, at 28.
40
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For a range of agencies, the role of developing and championing best practices
is on the rise,47 reflecting a number of trends. First, many agencies find
themselves without sufficient authority to promulgate binding rules as new
technologies emerge. Second, even where an agency may have formal authority,
it might be reluctant to use it in the face of an emerging technology where it
needs to act more quickly than formal notice-and-comment rulemaking allows.
Third, the agency may lack sufficient confidence that a prescriptive rule is
warranted and thus leaves open a range of options, merely narrowing the field
of possibilities and pointing entities in the right direction.48
To develop best practices effectively, an agency must invest significant
resources in the enterprise. Stated generally, this effort involves “horizontal
modeling rather than hierarchical direction” and is “a method of regulation in
which central administrators provide advice and disseminate information,
instead of mandating a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme.”49 In an increasing
number of cases, best practices focus not only on U.S. firms, but also those
across the world, requiring that the regulatory agency coordinate its international
counterparts.50 Moreover, to develop emerging best practices, it is important that
agency staff take the time to learn the details of “the regulated entities first-hand,
develop a strong sense of emerging processes, and . . . [share] knowledge of
these processes with staff at other locations.”51
Where an agency (or a private entity) identifies and disseminates a best
practice, it acts as a “norm entrepreneur.”52 As discussed in Part III, the FTC has
performed this role in the online privacy and data security contexts, articulating
and recommending a set of best practices.53 One virtue of this role—like soft
law more generally—is that it may well make the adoption of more formal
regulation less necessary.54 To the extent that the articulation of the relevant

47

David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 295 (2006) (“Although bestpractice rulemaking has been largely ignored by the legal literature, regulation through best
practices has increased seven-fold in the past ten years . . . .”).
48 Id. at 324 (citing BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 2
(2004)) (noting value of providing a limited set of options).
49 Id. at 297.
50 See Zaring, supra note 47, at 299.
51 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 354 (1998).
52 See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2041, 2046 (2000).
53 Id. at 2046-52.
54 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 586 (2008) (arguing that soft law may prompt people to adjust their
behavior, therefore obviating need for hard law). Commenting in the European Union context,
where the use of soft law is more prevalent, one observer defined soft law as “rules of conduct
that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such,
but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may
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norm itself does not overcome the collective action problem and catalyze
compliance with a norm, a certification regime (like Energy Star) for those who
are compliant (along with naming and shaming) might do so.
One path for catalyzing compliance, which can be labeled as “jawboning” or
“threats,” involves the use of apparent legal authority—say, opening up an
investigation—to achieve a desired result. In a provocative article, Professor
Tim Wu defends the use of “threats,” calling for norm entrepreneurship by
agency leaders and the development of limiting principles for the practice.55 In
criticizing Wu’s argument, some commentators have characterized it as
condoning lawless conduct.56 In that spirit, I previously criticized the FCC’s use
of its merger review authority to secure outcomes in other contexts that were not
specifically related to the merger.57 I also called the FCC’s use of “arm twisting”
controversial when done without full transparency and a willingness to take
formal action.58 Finally, I noted that the tactic is “dangerous” if the agency is not
willing and able to follow through with formal regulation if the called-for
behavior does not take place, as the meaningless nature of the threat will become
plain and the agency will lose credibility.59
Any agency that develops best practices should be aware of the potential risks
of such an effort. For starters, if an agency’s identified best practices are allowed
to become stale, some private actors might stick with them and fail to improve
their practice. Second, given that there is no judicial oversight of best practices
development,60 it is important that agencies pre-commit to a level of procedural
regularity and fairness in how they develop them. Third, without either carrots
or sticks related to best practices, an agency may find it difficult to generate
attention or catalyze compliance.61

produce practical effects.” Linda A.J. Senden, Soft Law and Its Implications for Institutional
Balance in the EC, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 79, 81 (2005).
55 See Tim Wu, Essay, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1842-43 (2011) (arguing that
the use of threats is useful and justified where regulated industry undergoes rapid change).
56 See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 65 (2015)
(criticizing “informal enforcement” where formal actions are proscribed by First Amendment
or other legal constraints); Jerry Brito, “Agency Threats” and the Rule of Law: An Offer You
Can’t Refuse, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 553 (2014) (criticizing “policymaking through
the issuance of completely unenforceable threats”).
57 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 708-11.
58 Weiser, supra note 35, at 559.
59 See id. at 559-60.
60 See Zaring, supra note 47, at 310 (noting lack of judicial review or requirement to use
open notice-and-comment process); infra Section III.C.
61 Where the best practices developed by an agency might arguably provide a safe harbor
from potential tort liability, that can be a powerful incentive. Similarly, where a governmental
authority supports a best practice—either by requirement (say, a zoning code) or subsidy—it
can encourage compliance. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 47, at 326-38 (discussing Clean
Water Act’s Section 319 approach to reducing nonpoint source pollution).
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Private Regulation

As exemplified by the LEED building standard, a private regulatory initiative
can drive behavior toward a social goal. Given the need to respond to emerging
issues more adaptably than traditional regulatory processes allow, public
agencies may be tempted to rely on private bodies.62 In the internet environment,
for example, a range of issues are managed by multi-stakeholder organizations,
which use “dialogue to develop voluntary norms and best practices.”63 Similarly,
in the environmental field, a range of “private activity generates pressure on
environmental behavior without resulting in a statute, regulation, agency
enforcement action, or court decision for review by scholars and
policymakers.”64
The role of private, multi-stakeholder efforts in internet governance is the
U.S. government’s official policy.65 Since the development of the internet’s
basic technical standards in the 1980s and 1990s by groups like the Internet
Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) and the World Wide Web Consortium
(“W3C”), “these entities have largely established the norms and standards for
the global internet, but they are little known to the general public.”66 The U.S.
government recently fully embraced this model, recognizing the need for
internet policy and governance issues to be developed in an adaptable and global
fashion.67 This embrace includes supporting the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) as an independent, international
body to oversee the internet’s numbering system.68
In the internet context, two private regulatory efforts bear notice, as both exist
in tandem with legal and regulatory oversight. First, the Copyright Alert System
(overseen by the Center for Copyright Information) was a cooperative effort
between broadband providers and content providers focused on addressing

62

See Pitofsky, supra note 38 (explaining reasons why governmental agencies might
encourage private regulation).
63 Joe Waz & Phil Weiser, Internet Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder
Organizations, 10 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 331, 336 (2012).
64 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129,
138 (2013).
65 See Waz & Weiser, supra note 63, at 344 n.29.
66 Id. at 332.
67 See Lawrence E. Strickling, Moving Together Beyond Dubai, NAT’L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2013/moving-together-beyonddubai [https://perma.cc/93UD-MQGC].
68 Olivier Sylvain, Legitimacy and Expertise in Global Internet Governance, 13 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 31, 31-41 (2015).
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piracy in peer-to-peer networks.69 This initiative, which existed for four years,70
provided some measure of guidance to the broadband industry on what sort of
“repeat infringer” policy was reasonable.71 In light of recent court decisions
holding a broadband provider liable for failing to develop an appropriate repeat
infringer policy, the guidance from this organization could be considered best
practice and protect a provider from liability,72 although its cessation of
operations may limit its impact. Second, the Broadband Internet Technical
Advisory Group (“BITAG”) is a multi-stakeholder organization that seeks to
define best practices and broadband network management ahead of any FCC
action under its network neutrality regime.73 In its most recent regulatory
decision on network neutrality, the FCC highlighted its openness to “obtain[ing]
objective advice from industry standard-setting bodies or similar organizations,”
specifically citing BITAG as an example.74
Both the Center for Copyright Information and BITAG relied on a mix of
industry representatives and public interest advocates and operated in an open,
transparent, and consensus-based manner.75 Like frequency coordinators and the
69

See What Is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO.,
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/what-is-a-copyright-alert
[https://perma.cc/BXE9-ATP5] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (explaining how Copyright Alert
worked).
70 See Statement on the Copyright Alert System, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. (Jan. 27, 2017),
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/statement/statement-on-the-copyright-alert-system/
[https://perma.cc/H8MV-6XRT] (discussing how the Copyright Alert System closed down in
early 2017).
71 In the Memorandum of Understanding for the Copyright Alert System the parties stated
that the practices adopted did not speak to the standard of liability imposed by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), but the framework still provided a plausible basis for
establishing the reasonableness of the participating ISP’s attitude toward repeat infringers.
Memorandum of Understanding 8-9 (2011), https://www.copyrightinformation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4SM-6WZ
K]; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2012) (conditioning DMCA immunity on proof that
defendant “adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service
provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers”).
72 BMG Rights Mgmt. (US), LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 634, 661 (E.D.
Va. 2015) (faulting Cox for failing to implement adequate repeat-infringer policy).
73 See
BITAG History, BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP.,
https://www.bitag.org/bitag_organization.php?action=history# [https://perma.cc/A5S8-QZV
4] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
74 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5612, 5720 n.697
(2015).
75 BITAG’s membership is outlined at BITAG Membership, BROADBAND INTERNET TECH.
ADVISORY GRP., http://members.bitag.org/kwspub/BITAG_Membership [https://perma.cc/
6WUV-UANV] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). The membership of the Center for Copyright
Information is outlined at About CCI, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., http://www.copyright

2026

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:2011

NAD, the bodies confronted the challenge of earning their legitimacy and claim
to regulatory authority. If such efforts succeeded, the FCC and copyright courts
would regard their guidance as meaningful, just as the FTC and courts do with
respect to the actions of the NAD.76
In the environmental realm, the Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”) is an
instructive case study on how a multi-stakeholder private regulatory initiative
can have a major impact. The MSC, founded by the World Wildlife Fund and
Unilever, was launched to address the concern about fisheries operating in a
sustainable fashion.77 As one commentator explained, “[t]he MSC administers
standards for sustainable fisheries, updates the standards periodically with input
from a stakeholder advisory group, evaluates fisheries, and allows those
fisheries that meet certain criteria to label their fish as MSC-certified.”78 The
MSC standard focuses on three core concerns: (1) maintaining sustainable fish
stocks; (2) minimizing any adverse environmental impact; and (3) managing the
fishery effectively, including compliance with relevant legal requirements.79
Under the MSC-administered regime, independent private auditors must assess
compliance with the relevant standards and compliant products can be labeled
as such.80 Indeed, the MSC regime allows any organization with concerns
related to certification to make a formal objection during the certification
process.81

information.org/about-cci [https://perma.cc/U6NH-2NFU] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). See
Waz & Weiser, supra note 63, at 342-43 (discussing best practices for such organizations
generally).
76 Villafranco & Riley, supra note 40, at 80.
77 MSC Fisheries Standard, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/aboutus/standards/fisheries-standard [https://perma.cc/D3D4-Y6E9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017);
Sustainable Seafood: The First 20 Years, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://20years.msc.org/ [https://perma.cc/E96R-Z8EZ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). It was based on a
similar model, the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) program, also founded by the World
Wildlife Fund. See Our History, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/enus/who-we-are/our-history [https://perma.cc/28X4-Q23N] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017);
What’s Behind the FSC Logo?, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.worldwild
life.org/stories/what-s-behind-the-fsc-logo [https://perma.cc/6ZC9-WJL3] (last visited Nov.
17, 2017) (discussing connection between World Wildlife Fund and FSC).
78 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 149 (citing About Us, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.msc.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/7DW4-5MT5] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017)).
79 MSC Fisheries Standard, supra note 77.
80 See Get Certified, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/getcertified/fisheries/msc-fisheries-standard-explained [https://perma.cc/W2SM-LCWF] (last
visited Nov. 17, 2017).
81 Patricia A. Moye, Private Certification Versus Public Certification in the International
Environmental Arena: The Marine Stewardship Council and Marine Eco-Label Japan
Fisheries Certification Schemes as Case Studies, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 533, 544 (2010).
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The MSC provides a powerful example of how private regulation can work
even when not reinforced by public regulation.82 By 2012, sixty percent of the
fish caught in U.S. fisheries for human consumption were MSC-certified and
major corporations, such as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s, had committed to
selling only MSC-certified, wild-caught fish.83 Moreover, the MSC’s private
regime drove compliance with the nonbinding Code of Conduct, developed by
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, by making it part of its
requirements.84 After surveying this regime and formal regulatory efforts to
address the issue, one commentator concluded that the MSC model was more
successful than traditional regulatory efforts in this area and that “private
regulation is best situated to address the complex problem of fisheries
depletion.”85
In short, private regulatory efforts, such as those led by multi-stakeholder
organizations, can influence private behavior whether they operate in tandem
with public regulatory oversight or in a vacuum created by a lack of regulatory
oversight. Whether they operate in the backdrop of public oversight or as a
standalone effort, private bodies need to establish their legitimacy to influence
behavior on the ground. To do so, they must have sufficient independence from
those they oversee, enabling both regulators and consumers to trust their
judgments (including determinations of compliance).86

82 To be sure, the FTC serves as an important public backstop, overseeing unfair and
deceptive marketing practices. In particular, the FTC has developed “Green Guides,” which
govern the MSC’s actions. Jason J. Czarnezki, Andrew Homan & Meghan Jeans,
Greenwashing and Self-Declared Seafood Ecolabels, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 48 (2014). In
the past, the FTC has taken action against third party certification efforts, sanctioning
TRUSTe for its failure to conduct annual recertification. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal Program: Company
Failed to Conduct Annual Recertifications, Facilitated Misrepresentation as Non-Profit (Nov. 17,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-itdeceived-consumers-through-its [https://perma.cc/RCM5-2JSU].
83 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 150. Part of what drives such behavior is that outside
groups monitor compliance (or lack thereof). Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of
Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 75 (2006).
84 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 150.
85 Moye, supra note 81, at 564. Other commentators offer more qualified praise. See, e.g.,
Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Accountability Arrangements in Non-State Standards Organizations:
Instrumental Design and Imitation, 15 ORG. 563, 570 (2008) (praising MSC model as
complement to and catalyst for public regulatory oversight in this area); Zdravka Tzankova,
Interactions Between Private and Public Resource Governance: Key Insights from the
Fisheries Case, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 4 n.13, 6, 25 (2014) (same); see also ARCHON
FUNG ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY: WHAT MAKES DISCLOSURE
POLICIES EFFECTIVE? 29 (2004), http://ash.harvard.edu/files/political_econ_transparency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8H6X-WRBU].
86 Deborah Platt Majoras, FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE FTC 4-5 (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
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Hacking the Bureaucracy

In most situations, Congress and agencies think along traditional lines and
agency leaders continue on the established path of agency regulation, underutilizing the alternative models discussed above.87 There are a number of reasons
for this dynamic, including the power of “path dependency and bureaucratic
entrenchment.”88 Even more powerfully, the incentives for policymakers are
often to avoid Type 1 errors—those visible errors of commission—that arise
when trying a new strategy that might fail. By contrast, the hidden Type 2
errors—ones of omission—are permissible and a regular feature of bureaucratic
inertia.89
On one account, the challenge of leading a bureaucracy is captured by the
reality that governmental employees, who enjoy civil service protection, can tell
their politically-selected leaders, “I was here long before you arrived and will be
here long after you are gone.” In practice, such explicit defiance is the exception.
Regardless of whether bureaucratic inertia is willful or based on an entrenched
tradition governmental agencies are built to continue the same course.
Consequently, any course corrections require energetic leadership.90 And
governmental employees are generally conditioned “to be quiet, take orders, and
do their jobs in a repetitive way.”91 On the positive side, governmental
employees tend to have a service orientation and are mission driven, meaning

self-regulatory-organizations-and-ftc/050411selfregorgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/53ZF-Q4Y3]
(underscoring this issue and invoking Better Business Bureau as case in point).
87 Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and
Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 306-07 (2015) (“[O]ne can reasonably expect
underutilization of such alternatives to agency-driven regulation merely because they are
novel and command-and-control programs are well entrenched.”).
88 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2012).
89 See DANIEL C. ESTY, REGULATORY EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE
5 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4714-esty-ppr-bicregulatordiscussionpaper062015pdf [https://perma.cc/XNU6-D7MQ] (“Inertia is a powerful force in every
organization, but especially in government where there is often little incentive to innovate.”).
This dynamic is further reinforced by cognitive biases, notably, the “endowment effect.”
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 605 (2012).
90 On a critical account, “[o]pportunism, conflict of interest, and asymmetric
information—the bases of willful noncompliance—are rampant at the lower level.” Terry M.
Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 17 (1994). On a more generous take, “the career incentives and training of civil servants
usually orient them towards perpetuating the stability of their institutions, rather than
embracing administrative innovations.” Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 421, 473 (2015).
91 JOHN P. KOTTER, ACCELERATE: BUILDING STRATEGIC AGILITY FOR A FASTER-MOVING
WORLD 15 (2014).
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that effective engagement around the mission and purpose of the agenda can
catalyze innovation and collaboration.92
Bureaucratic inertia and autopilot administration not only prevent innovative
programs from being developed, but also can lead existing programs to be
administered badly. Take, for example, the development of the healthcare.gov
website. After Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, a health care
economist, David Cutler, encouraged the White House to treat the
administration of the law more like “launching a start-up than passing a law.”93
In particular, Cutler made clear that the default strategy—using the existing
personnel at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)—for
administering the law was a recipe for failure.94 In an assessment ignored by the
White House, he explained that CMS “is demoralized, the best people have left,
IT services are antiquated, and there are fewer employees than in 1981, despite
a much larger burden.”95
Cutler’s call for an entrepreneurial approach to implementing the Affordable
Care Act was rejected by President Obama.96 Perhaps fearing the need to
manage political warfare with House Republicans or responding to the HHS’
interest in protecting its turf, President Obama agreed to, in Cutler’s words, pile
“new responsibilities onto a broken system.”97 As this episode underscores, even
when the current system is flawed, the pressure to use it is powerful. As a result,
the healthcare.gov website cost $800 million to develop, whereas Twitter, which
serves a similar number of users and is of comparable complexity, cost only $60
million.98
The redeeming part of the healthcare.gov story is that it demonstrates that
treating a government project like a startup can work. After the failed rollout of
healthcare.gov (which only enabled six people to sign up for insurance on its
first day), President Obama essentially embraced Cutler’s recommendation,
92

Robert Lavigna, Why Government Workers Are Harder to Motivate, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 28, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/11/why-government-workers-are-harder-to-motivate
[https://perma.cc/RR92-YSUD] (“Research has shown that public servants find meaning in
their work by making a positive difference in the lives of the citizens they serve. This is an
advantage in building engagement.”).
93 Ezra Klein, The Memo that Could Have Saved Obamacare, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/11/04/the-memo-that-could-havesaved-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/XPL4-QRF3].
94 See id.
95 Memorandum from David Cutler to Larry Summers (May 11, 2010), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/files/2013/11/Cutler-implementation-memo-1.pdf?tid=a_in
l [https://perma.cc/VJ82-HTQP].
96 See Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, HealthCare.gov: How a Start-Up Failed to
Launch, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2013, at A01.
97 Memorandum from David Cutler to Larry Summers, supra note 95, at 3; Goldstein &
Eilperin, supra note 96, at A01. (“[T]he project was hampered by the White House’s political
sensitivity to Republican hatred of the law . . . .”).
98 Jon Gertner, Obama and His Geeks, FAST COMPANY, July-Aug. 2015, at 56, 64-65.
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authorizing Todd Park, Mikey Dickerson, and a team of entrepreneurs to operate
in a new structure that was called “tech surge.”99 This project, like a good startup,
approached the challenge of building an effective website from first principles.
Rather than ask how the government had done IT projects before, the team
innovated (for government) in a number of important ways, including using
Amazon Web Services to support the site.100 In developing the new website, it
broke from the traditional bureaucratic process of “waterfall” development
(where every step is prescribed and locked-in) and used “agile” development
(where the process is iterative and evolves along the way).101 Finally, the team
built a login system for $4 million (with annual maintenance costs of $1 million)
to replace the initial version that did not work well and cost $250 million to build
(with $70 million annual maintenance costs).102
In an important legacy of this effort, Park and Dickerson continued to work
in government after fixing healthcare.gov, developing the new U.S. Digital
Service (“USDS”).103 The goal of the USDS is to lure a range of talented
technology professionals to the federal government, including data scientists,
product managers, and product designers.104 The USDS, in turn, provides
guidance to government agencies on questions like how they can use Amazon
Web Services.105 In short, the USDS supports entrepreneurial leadership in
government; and as Park said, it develops “people who can hack the technology,
as well as people who can hack the bureaucracy.”106
The healthcare.gov story now has two parts. The first is the cautionary tale
about government’s traditional inertial default setting—that is, to do things as
they were done before. The second underscores that entrepreneurial leadership

99 See Steven Levy, America’s Tech Guru Steps down—but He’s Not Done Rebooting the
Government, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2014, 2:15 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/healthcaregov/ [https://perma.cc/43JY-3XKB].
100 See Robinson Meyer, The Secret Startup that Saved the Worst Website in America,
ATLANTIC (July 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/the-secretstartup-saved-healthcare-gov-the-worst-website-in-america/397784/ [https://perma.cc/P9LLJ689].
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Gertner, supra note 98, at 62.
104 See id.
105 For one example of its impact, and another encouraging post-healthcare.gov tale of
entrepreneurial leadership, consider the Veterans’ Administration’s recent progress in
improving its service delivery. See Nick Sinai, The Untold Story of VA Leadership, MEDIUM
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://medium.com/@NickSinai/the-untold-story-of-va-leadership-f6d763ec
6c51#.otd5qig33 [https://perma.cc/F2C9-3VVJ].
106 Gertner, supra note 98, at 64.
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in government is both possible and important, and can lead to transformative
results.107
The positive legacy of the healthcare.gov story is that entrepreneurial leaders
in government can free their agencies from “the mental grip of conventional
structures on the capacity to consider alternatives.”108 In so doing, such leaders
can facilitate the development of alternative regulatory strategies. Similarly,
governmental agencies face the challenge of overcoming the institutional bias
that “experts may myopically focus on issues within their area of expertise and
thereby fail to recognize that a decision would benefit from accessing other
bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking.”109 In short, an important role of
entrepreneurial leadership in government is to examine issues through the lens
of first principles.110
The concept of policy entrepreneurship recognizes that an entrepreneurial
mindset and skillset can be applied to governance to foster innovative results.
Professor Adam Sheingate, for example, defines the concept as the “skillful
manipulation of politics [that] somehow results in the creation of a new policy
or a new bureaucratic agency, creates a new institution, or transforms an existing
one.”111 This type of leadership can also be seen in the development of, for
example, the MSC program, the FTC’s oversight of online privacy, and the
Energy Star program. In a world where the best solutions may well require new
models of regulation, it is critical that agency leaders experiment with new
solutions.112

107 A complementary initiative to USDS is the White House Office of Social and
Behavioral Sciences, which encourages a range of experiments to improve government
performance and policy outcomes. See Justin Wolfers, Making Government Work More Like
Google, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2015, § BU (Economic View), at 6. As one commentator put
it, the office seeks to “[e]xperiment relentlessly, keep what works, and discard what doesn’t”
and has already developed a number of successes. Id.
108 Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 1075.
109 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 89, at 560; see id. at 599-600 (suggesting strategies for
improving governmental decisionmaking).
110 The goal of this mindset is to frame a problem in general terms and evaluate whether
there are innovative strategies for solving it by getting people to look past the obvious and
traditional approaches. See Tony McCaffrey & Jim Pearson, Find Innovation Where You
Least Expect It, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 82, 88-89.
111 Adam Sheingate, Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American
Political Development, 17 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 185, 188 (2003); see also MARK SCHNEIDER,
PAUL TESKE & MICHAEL MINTROM, PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 8 (1995) (defining public entrepreneurs as those who identify
opportunities, take risks, and work with others to pursue goals); Peter G. Klein et al., Toward
a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship, 7 EUR. MGMT. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“[P]ublic entrepreneurs
are alert to opportunities for gain, exercise judgment over the use of private and public
resources, and may pursue innovative products and processes.”).
112 To that end, in her Nobel Prize talk, Elinor Ostrom highlighted the importance of
institutional innovation. See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric
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A significant hurdle for entrepreneurial leadership in government—and a
foundation of the inertial default setting—is the lack of acceptance of failure as
an outcome. In practice, this means that governmental agencies often reflexively
turn to traditional regulatory models and do not consider untested alternatives
(often out of fear of failure).113 This instinct mirrors the old private sector saw
that “nobody got fired for buying IBM.”114 Citing the fear of failure and risk
aversion, former Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick explained, “there may
be no industry less susceptible to innovation than government.”115 There are,
however, exceptions, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (“DARPA”), which makes a conscious effort to promote a “risk-taking
and failure-tolerant culture.”116
In the entrepreneurship environment, failure is a normal state, providing data,
an opportunity to iterate, and a spur to refine a product offering.117
Consequently, entrepreneurs celebrate the need to “fail fast” on new experiments
by trying them on a small scale and determining as quickly as possible whether
they can work.118 As two advocates of innovation in government put it, “[a]
Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 665 (2010) (“We need
to ask how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder the innovativeness, learning,
adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more
effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.”).
113 Glen Hepburn, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ALTERNATIVES TO
TRADITIONAL REGULATION 10 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42245468.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8GQT-HJ6C] (“The ‘regulate first’ approach may mean that more
effective and efficient policy instruments are being overlooked.”).
114 See id. at 11-12 (noting that non-traditional strategies are generally eschewed by riskaverse regulators).
115 Deval Patrick on Government Innovation and the Massachusetts “Edge,” MASS. INST.
TECH. (May 12, 2015), http://mitsloan.mit.edu/newsroom/articles/deval-patrick-on-govern
ment-innovation-and-the-massachusetts-edge [https://perma.cc/PLZ3-PDTJ].
116 Stephen Overly, This Agency Loses a Quarter of Its Workers Each Year—and That’s a
Good Thing, WASH. POST (July 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2016/07/14/why-high-employee-turnover-keeps-one-agency-innovative/
[https://perma.cc/MC9W-H56Q]; see DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, INNOVATION
AT DARPA 2 (2016), http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/DARPA_Innovation_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8XRK-KNYA].
117 As one writer described entrepreneurs, “[t]hey’ve been conditioned to see failure as a
learning experience—that, rather than being the end of something, a big flop is merely a very
useful (though painful) data point along the way to success.” Jason Feifer, This Exclusive
Study Reveals Entrepreneurs Really Do Have Thicker Skins, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/284075 [https://perma.cc/VM3F-23RN].
118 As one commentator explained: “Fail fast isn’t about the big issues, it’s about the little
ones. It’s an approach to running a company or developing a product that embraces lots of
little experiments with the idea that some will work and grow and others will fail and die.”
David Brown, Here’s What ‘Fail Fast’ Really Means, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 15, 2015, 7:00
AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/15/heres-what-fail-fast-really-means [https://perma.cc/
2S3G-4HV8].
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culture of innovation means continuously exploring and adopting new processes
in an ecosystem where risk is incentivized, not precluded.”119 Similarly,
entrepreneurial leadership in government authorizes calculated risk-taking and,
more importantly, provides cover for trial-and-error learning when the trials do
not produce the envisioned results.120 Unfortunately, leaders who support
experimentation and are willing to accept the inevitable failures, are the
exception, not the rule.121
The basic entrepreneurial methodology of experiment-measure-iterate is
captured in Eric Ries’s classic book, The Lean Startup.122 A core thesis of the
book, widely accepted in the entrepreneurial community (and ignored by most
legal scholars),123 is that companies should develop and market a “minimum
viable product,” solicit feedback from actual customers, and improve it based on
that data.124 At Facebook, this philosophy was adopted and embodied in its
mantra, “[d]one is better than perfect.” Citing that mantra, one commentator
explained that “had Facebook waited so much as a year to perfect its model, the
company might very well be where MySpace is today.”125
The Ries philosophy is famously captured in a feedback loop representing the
cycle of innovation.126 The core idea is to embrace experimentation, gather data

119

GEORGETOWN UNIV., THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION: INSTITUTIONALIZING
INNOVATION IN FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 7 (2016), https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/z0vlob
eoycdlo54g4wxby87kk71c3aua [https://perma.cc/GC32-BRQZ].
120 See Quentin Hardy, G.A.O. Tech Chief Says Washington Should Start Small on Big
Projects, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/ga-o-tech-director-says-washington-needs-to-think-smaller/ (noting failure to develop pilot
projects and to candidly assess failing efforts).
121 Philadelphia Mayor Mike Nutter is one of those exceptions, stating: “If you don’t fail,
you’re not trying hard enough.” Li Zhou, City Governments Are Collaborating with Startups,
and Acting Like Ones Themselves, SMITHSONIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.smithsonian
mag.com/innovation/citie-governments-are-collaborating-startups-and-acting-ones-themselv
es-180955483/ [https://perma.cc/2ZWN-NLAZ].
122 See generally ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP: HOW TODAY’S ENTREPRENEURS USE
CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES (2011).
123 One exception is Richard S. Gruner, Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and
Overcoming Legal Uncertainty in Business Enterprises and Other Complex Organizations,
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 247, 292-93 (2014).
124 RIES, supra note 122, at 3-5. This methodology is very close to the approach espoused
by “design-centered thinking,” which also emphasizes the importance of prototyping. On this
approach, the goal of developing, testing, and even marketing a prototype is “to learn about
the strengths and weaknesses of the idea and to identify new directions that further
prototyping might take.” Tim Brown, Design Thinking, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2008, at 84,
87.
125 Martin Lindstrom, The Truth About Being “Done” Versus Being “Perfect,” FAST
COMPANY (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com/3001533/truth-about-being-doneversus-being-perfect [https://perma.cc/JJ6M-MNX2].
126 RIES, supra note 122, at 9-11.
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(whether it signals success or failure), and iterate.127 The lean startup model,
represented by the following diagram, focuses on taking ideas from prototype to
feedback to improvement:128

This lean startup model echoes the style of software development championed
by open source software, which calls for releasing code that can be viewed and
improved by a community of users and developers. In what Eric Raymond
dubbed “Linus’s Law,” in honor of the founder and coordinator of Linux, the
open source maxim is “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”129 This
approach has spread far beyond open source, enabling “business webs where
focused companies partner others to innovate and create value.”130 Although this

127

See id.
The Lean Startup Methodology, THE LEAN STARTUP, http://theleanstartup.com/
principles [https://perma.cc/7WVV-VNQ8] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
129 Scott Merrill, With Many Eyeballs, All Bugs Are Shallow, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23,
2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/02/23/with-many-eyeballs-all-bugs-are-shallow/ [https://
perma.cc/W2AT-H78N].
130 Don Tapscott, The World in 2036, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.econ
omist.com/node/17509361 [https://perma.cc/HS2S-F59Z]. In referencing this concept, and
Linus’s Law, I do not mean to suggest that the open source model is perfect or even
necessarily always better than proprietary software, which has some advantages as managed
by a single firm. Consider, for example, the shortcomings of the open source program
Heartbleed, which led to a major security vulnerability in OpenSSL. See Robert McMillan,
How Heartbleed Broke the Internet—and Why It Can Happen Again, WIRED (Apr. 14, 2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/04/heartbleedslesson [http://perma.cc/EF6Z-E6L7]. In that
case, the mostly-volunteer labor force was too short-handed to keep the software bug-free,
demonstrating that “we must add more oversight to the internet’s underlying infrastructure.”
Id.
128
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approach and a commitment to prototyping and testing solutions is novel in
government, it is starting to take root, with promising results.131
With respect to the fear of failure, government operates quite differently than
the entrepreneurial world. In government, the perceived costs of failure are
sufficiently high that many governmental leaders decline to introduce a new
initiative for fear it will fail or refuse to admit that an existing program is failing,
even though that admission is a necessary predicate for improvement. To be
sure, there are cases like the initial healthcare.gov rollout where the failure is
readily apparent and must be fixed. In other cases, however, governmental
leaders stand by programs where the data backing up its effectiveness is either
uncertain or doubtful.
For an instructive case of governmental leaders refusing to acknowledge the
limitations of a program, consider the case of the EPA’s Performance Track
program. When created, the program was supposed to highlight those companies
with stellar environmental records.132 In practice, however, it ultimately became,
as EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson put it, “just one of those window-dressing
programs that has little value.”133 Similarly, the EPA Inspector General
criticized the program as ineffective, noting that it did not provide “a new model
for achieving” its stated goals and very few companies met their stated goals.134
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration did not make any real changes to the
program before the Obama Administration cancelled it.135
The Performance Track program story, like the failure to acknowledge the
failings of the healthcare.gov website earlier, underscores that the hesitancy to
acknowledge failure is a major challenge in governmental administration. If
governmental leaders refuse to acknowledge failures, they undermine the ability
to learn—and iterate—from mistakes and instead allow failed programs to

131 For a criticism of government’s lack of investment in experiments, see Peter Orzag &
John Bridgeland, Can Government Play Moneyball?, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2013, at 62
(concluding that “federal government—where spending decisions are largely based on good
intentions, inertia, hunches, partisan politics, and personal relationships—has missed this
wave”). For a discussion of the use of this approach, see Russell Shorto, Water Works, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2014, at MM20 (discussing use of public design challenge).
132 John Sullivan and John Shiffman, Green Club an EPA Charade, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec.
12, 2008, A01.
133 Id.
134 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Report No. 2007-P-00013, PERFORMANCE TRACK COULD
IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE VALUE 4, 15, 18 (2007),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/20070329-2007-p-00013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8HX-Q33L]; see generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash,
Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship”
Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (criticizing Performance Track
program).
135 Coglianese & Nash, supra note 134, at 8.
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continue during a period of denial.136 Or, as Lawrence Summers put it while
reflecting on the healthcare.gov debacle, it is crucial to resist the “overwhelming
temptation for everyone involved [in a project] to circle the wagons and promise
rapid repair so as to hold critics at bay.”137
Another challenging dynamic for governmental leaders to address is the
impact of unconscious bias. It is normal for those involved in a project to believe
that it is working, following what Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman calls
“confirmation bias.”138 As one commentator put it, a challenge for those
evaluating regulatory experiments is that those “deeply involved in the
implementation of a particular regulation are likely to see the benefits of such a
project far more clearly than the costs.”139 As commentators have explained,
there are a number of strategies for overcoming this bias, including using red
team-blue team exercises, appointing a Devil’s Advocate, and creating a process
for deliberate decisionmaking.140 Of course, as happened in the Performance
Track situation, new leadership is able to bring a fresh perspective. Ideally,
however, existing leaders can step back and ask, “if a new leader came in and
took a fresh look, what would she do?”141

136

Id. at 86 (“To achieve the true learning potential from these programs, government
officials must be prepared to accept that innovations can sometimes fail.”).
137 Lawrence Summers, Lawrence Summers: Immediate Lessons from Health-Care
Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lawrencesummers-immediate-lessons-from-health-care-reform/2013/11/10/5b5be00e-48c8-11e3-a19
6-3544a03c2351_story.html?utm_term=.245c9ac1e9e0 [https://perma.cc/WR7W-ZS2E].
138 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST & SLOW 80-81 (2011).
139 Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 119 (David Moss & John Cisternino
eds., 2009).
140 In their book, Decisive, the Heath brothers examine such strategies for improving
evaluation and decisionmaking. See CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, DECISIVE: HOW TO MAKE
BETTER CHOICES IN LIFE AND WORK 22-23 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1015-16
(2005) (advocating use of “devil’s advocates” to improve decision making).
141 Andy Grove, in his classic, Only the Paranoid Survive, tells a story just along these
lines on how Intel decided to get out of the memory chip business and focus on
microprocessors:
I was in my office with Intel’s chairman and CEO, Gordon Moore, and we were
discussing our quandary. Our mood was downbeat. I looked out the window at the Ferris
Wheel of the Great America amusement park revolving in the distance, then I turned
back to Gordon and asked, “If we got kicked out and the board brought in a new CEO,
what do you think he would do?” Gordon answered without hesitation, “He would get
us out of memories.” I stared at him, numb, then said, “Why don’t you and I walk out the
door, come back and do it ourselves?”
ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE: HOW TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS POINTS THAT
CHALLENGE EVERY COMPANY AND CAREER 89 (1996). For another telling of this story and its
impact, see HEATH & HEATH, supra note 140, at 13-16.

2017]

ENTREPRENEURIAL ADMINISTRATION

2037

The role of entrepreneurial leadership in encouraging candid reflection and
criticism is essential. As former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic and David Hyman
explain, agencies develop an institutional culture and a reputation (or a brand,
as they put it).142 In some cases, that brand can be one of reliability and
commitment to data-driven decisionmaking. An important role of an
entrepreneurial leader is to develop and maintain that commitment. In the case
of Underwriters Laboratory (“UL”), for example, its early leadership did just
that, building up “UL’s reputation for reliability by creating organizational
structures, administrative routines, and oversight systems designed to prevent
mistakes and misconduct.”143 To get past the natural status quo bias, an
entrepreneurial leader should welcome diverse ideas, criticism, different
options, and experimentation.144 In Part II, to explain how policy
entrepreneurship can earn regulatory authority, I discuss how experimental
initiatives need to establish their effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability to
be embraced as lasting regulatory regimes.
II.

CRITERIA FOR SOUND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND REGULATORY
EXPERIMENTATION

Whether by design or default, Congress often sits back, allowing regulatory
authorities and private entities to experiment with innovative regulatory
strategies. Under the traditional model of regulation, this phenomenon is viewed
as a bug—or an aberration. In practice, however, this alternative model is
emerging as a feature of our regulatory system and is a strategy that Congress
should use more self-consciously going forward.
This Part discusses the three principal criteria for regulatory innovation. First,
regulatory experiments should establish their effectiveness through after-thefact assessment. Second, regulatory experiments should be legitimate, both in
terms of their legal status and how they operate in practice. Third, regulatory
experiments should be accountable—that is, they need to operate transparently
and as promised. After explaining these criteria, this Part evaluates the potential
objections to policy experimentation through entrepreneurial leadership.
A.

Effectiveness

The value of a regulatory experiment will depend on whether it advances its
envisioned purposes effectively. Historically, however, governments “have paid
remarkably little attention to analyzing regulations after adoption or to
evaluating the impacts of the procedures and practices that govern the regulatory

142

David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental
Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1472-74.
143 Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification
Can Overcome Constraints that Frustrate Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 539, 545 (2014).
144 HEATH & HEATH, supra note 140, at 95-97, 146, 168.
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process itself.”145 By explicitly encouraging an experimentalist approach to
regulation, Congress can change this dynamic and evaluate innovative
regulatory experiments before codifying, refining, tolerating, or rejecting them.
A core failing of our current regulatory system is its inability to generate and
evaluate regulatory experiments. To make this point, Professor Michael
Greenstone contrasts the process for evaluating prospective drugs—experiments
through randomized trials—with regulation (including those used to oversee
drug safety).146 Unlike drug evaluation trials, the process for evaluating
regulations is currently all at the front end. Put differently, our regulatory system
is unduly wedded to the traditional model of regulation (often an exclusively
front end, before-the-fact, process) and, insofar as we evaluate regulatory
effectiveness at all, the process for doing so is similarly front-loaded (as opposed
to after-the-fact).147
In encouraging experimentation in the public sector, it is important that
Congress recognize the impact of private regulatory efforts. Consider, for
example, that the Energy Star program could have been developed by a private
entity and the LEED standard could have been developed by the EPA. And even
where a private (or public) effort initially succeeds, continued success can only
be assured by a culture of continuous improvement through entrepreneurial
leadership.148
The Australian Office of Best Practices (“AOBP”) is a model of constant
commitment to experimentation and evaluation. Whereas the United States’
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (“OIRA”) is focused on the analysis of regulatory strategies before they
are adopted (notably, whether they are justified on cost-benefit analysis

145

COGLIANESE, supra note 6, at 7.
See Greenstone, supra note 139, at 114-18; Wansley, supra note 11, at 430-36
(suggesting model of randomized trials for evaluating experimental regulatory initiatives).
147 The limited, after-the-fact analysis of new initiatives is particularly problematic
because of the limits of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a means of gathering effective
and reliable data. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Essay, An Options Approach to Agency
Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 892 (2013) (“[T]he agency seldom has all the necessary
information to understand the intricacies of any industry.”); see generally Wendy E. Wagner,
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010)
(examining flaws and biases of traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking).
148 For private sector efforts, there is always the threat that “[t]o the extent that standards
are not maintained, the value of a label is undermined and consumer demand declines.” Tracey
M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards, Certification and
Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 154 (2013); see Sally Eden, The Work of
Environmental Governance Networks, 40 GEOFORUM 383, 392 (2009) (“[G]overnance
networks are not given nor guaranteed power, but remain precarious and must be continually
(re)produced, standardised, and normalised through complex networking, often against
competing networks.” (citations omitted)).
146
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grounds),149 the AOBP investigates the impact of regulatory initiatives in
practice.150 In another model, the U.K. Behavioral Insights team is an impressive
case study of continuous improvement applied to government.151 In the private
regulatory arena, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and
Labeling (“ISEAL”) Alliance has a similar mission, spearheading an effort to
enable its members to improve their programs and learn from one another.152 In
particular, this initiative calls for the “establishment of monitoring and
evaluation programs; the definition of the intended change; establishment of
appropriate indicators; data collection and evaluation; evaluation reports; and
learning and improvement.”153
The hardest cultural challenge for government is to develop the ability to
admit that an experiment did not work.154 The incentives are not only against
experimentation,155 but they also weigh against acknowledging that an
experiment failed. Indeed, cognitive bias itself can influence whether evaluators

149 Greenstone, supra note 139, at 111-12, 121 (“[O]ur regulatory system all too frequently
takes shots in the dark and we all too infrequently fail to find out if we have hit anything—or
even worse, we only find out when things have gone horribly wrong.”); Michael A.
Livermore, A Brief Comment on “Humanizing Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 2 EUR. J. RISK REG.
13, 16 (2011) (“[R]etrospective reviews have never been a priority, despite calls from a range
of commentators across the political spectrum.”).
150 Best Practice Regulation, DEP’T PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, https://www.pmc.gov.
au/regulation/best-practice-regulation [https://perma.cc/X3VD-9SJM] (last visited Nov. 17,
2017).
151 Who We Are, BEHAV. INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ about-us/
[https://perma.cc/TN4T-Q2MQ] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
152 Our Mission, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-us/our-mission
[https://perma.cc/9HSF-7RUK] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). “The ISEAL Alliance was
founded in 2002 by a pioneering group of sustainability standard-setters,” including the FSC
and the MSC. Our History, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/about-us/ourhistory [https://perma.cc/9GAJ-D3ZH] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). ISEAL initially stood for
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, but now it is
ISEAL alone. Id.
153 Colin Scott, Evaluating the Performance and Accountability of Regulators, 37 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 353, 370-71 (2014).
154 MICHAEL MANDEL & DIANA G. CAREW, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., REGULATORY
IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION: A POLITICALLY-VIABLE APPROACH TO U.S. REGULATORY
REFORM 13 (2013), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/05.2013Mandel-Carew_Regulatory-Improvement-Commission_A-Politically-Viable-Approach-toUS-Regulatory-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WVG-UZPE] (noting challenge of critically
evaluating past efforts as calling “unwanted attention to all of their regulations and programs,
and potentially rais[ing] embarrassing questions”).
155 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 787 (“Agency heads and
politicians rarely brag about the number of rules they have cut or amended so as to reduce
regulation. It is the new initiatives that get people’s attention.” (footnote omitted)).
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judge regulatory initiatives successful or not.156 To build a culture of
retrospection is thus not enough; that culture must also—perhaps aided by
outside perspectives—embrace harsh feedback and accept failure (at least when
resulting from competent administration) as a normal and valuable data point.
A culture of retrospection requires leadership that embraces critical
thinking.157 This mindset embraces both the trial and the error parts of “trialand-error,” allowing new ideas to be tried and errors to be accepted as an
inevitable part of the process.158 It also calls for rigorous evaluation of what is
working—and what is not working—about a regime in practice.159
Legislators and regulators around the world continue to look for models to
spur more effective and honest evaluation of regulatory programs in practice. To
drive a culture of honest re-examination in a particular agency takes
considerable vigilance and a willingness to re-examine the impact of past
programs. To aid such efforts, the European Union has developed a set of
“Impact Assessment” guidelines.160 In a recent attempt to spur such behavior
across the government, President Obama signed an executive order calling for
retrospectively evaluating the effectiveness of regulations.161 Reflecting the
skepticism about this and similar efforts,162 some commentators have called for

156 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 89, at 591 (“Cognitive biases can operate as insidiously
in the evaluation of regulatory policy as in its design.”); see DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF
IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 10922 (2010) (explaining how, once we create something, “we feel an increased sense of
ownership—and we begin to overvalue the usefulness and the importance of ‘our’ ideas”).
157 Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Making Dumb Groups Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Dec. 2014, at 90, 98 (“So if the leader of a group encourages information disclosure from the
beginning, even if it goes against the grain, members will probably do less self-silencing.”).
158 Until certain experiments are tried, it will be far from clear how they will turn out. See
Vernon L. Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
465, 472 (2003) (explaining how some breakthroughs “had to be discovered through market
experimentation”).
159 See Michael Lewis, Bond of Brilliance, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2016, at 132, 177
(discussing Danny Kahnemans’s insights generated for Israeli Army by examining what food
soldiers ate and did not eat). A close cousin of this approach is to observe how a regime
operates in parallel contexts. See STEVEN KELLMAN, UNLEASHING CHANGE: A STUDY OF
ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL IN GOVERNMENT 19 (2005) (noting that government procurement
reform can be guided by how successful private firms manage procurement).
160 See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 3, SEC (2009) 92 final
(Jan. 15, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/
iag_2009_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN9G-ZYJ4].
161 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Memorandum from
Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies 1 (Apr. 25, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/
memoranda/2011/m11-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZE7-XCMF].
162 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 155, at 778 (commenting that past state initiatives have
had “decidedly mixed” results); see JOSEPH E. ALDY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
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other structural innovations to facilitate more effective reexaminations of
regulatory effectiveness.163
This Article calls for entrepreneurial leadership and the development of an
agency culture that advances such retrospectives with a level of seriousness and
rigor.164 In most cases, agencies engage in an auto-pilot, check-the-box approach
to such matters.165 By contrast, agencies that create a learning culture are able to
continuously evaluate the impact of policy experiments, improve them, and
learn from the experience.166 To drive such cultures, Congress can choose to
acknowledge and defer to those agencies that take this process seriously;

LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF AGENCY
RULES AND THE EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY
POLICY 4 (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro%
2520Review%2520Draft%252011-17-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYT3-X2UH] (“[T]he
federal government has a mixed track record on retrospective review of existing rules.”); Cary
Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 57, 60 (2013)
(expressing skepticism about likely effectiveness of Obama Administration’s retrospective
effort).
163 E.g., Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and
Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 113 (2015) (calling for “collaborative
alternatives”); Mandel & Carew, supra note 154, at 2 (calling for regulatory improvement
commission).
164 This is the approach for which Professor Cass Sunstein has advocated. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 150, 172, 215 (2013) (explaining power of
cost-benefit analysis as way to unearth errors and enable their correction); Cass Sunstein,
Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Regulation: Looking Backward, Looking
Forward 2 (May 10, 2012) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/speeches/regulation-looking-backward-looking-forward-0510
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q28L-3GCW]) (“Regulatory systems need their own Billy Beanes
and Paul DePodestas[, the heroes of the book, Moneyball], avoiding anecdotes and intuitions,
and instead carefully assessing what rules will do before the fact and testing them after the
fact.”). In a sign of the importance of building such a mindset, agencies reported to the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) that retrospectives were more successful when
they followed from their own discretionary reviews rather than from mandates to perform
them. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-791, REEXAMINING REGULATIONS:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEWS 6 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07791.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BDRA6XK].
165 See Braithwaite, supra note 33, at 512 (“Regulatory practice tends to accept far too
readily presumptions that extant regulatory frameworks already have the right answers. The
law is often taken as self-evidently right; rational choice presumptions about how actors
respond to deterrence are ingrained in the face of the evidence we have that defiance often
exceeds deterrence effects.”).
166 See id. at 513-14 (examining concept of triple-loop learning, “where lessons about how
to revise regulatory goals and strategies are looped across all such organizations throughout
the economy,” and claiming that “more systematic approach to tripling loops of learning could
be one of the more cost-effective investments regulators can make in improvement”).
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recognize failed experiments, displaying more skepticism to those agencies that
fail to evaluate their work carefully; or refuse to recognize failed experiments.
B.

Legitimacy and Adherence to Public Norms

The legitimacy of agency actions (or private sector ones) depends on their
legal authority to act and their compliance with traditional administrative law
norms (even when not formally required). For both public agencies and private
entities, it is thus important that they establish their legitimacy, develop
standards of conduct, and enforce them by following fair and acceptable
processes.167 This Section first discusses public agencies’ legal authority to act
and then explains how both public agencies and private entities must follow
traditional law norms to establish and maintain legitimacy.
1.

Legal Authority to Act

For public agencies, it is essential that any experimentation fits within their
legal authority to act. Where agencies act contrary to their enabling legislation,
they can be properly accused of going rogue.168 In a classic scholarly treatment
of this point, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (known collectively as
“McNollgast”) have argued that congressionally-imposed structures and
procedures ensure that agencies stick to the path envisioned by Congress.169 On
this view, these restrictions address the “principal-agent” problem that occurs
when Congress legislates with one purpose in mind and agencies take another
course.170

167 See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705,
706 (1988) (“[I]n a community organized around rules, compliance is secured—to whatever
degree it is—at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is
addressed.”); see also Meidinger, supra note 8, at 287 (“Ultimately multi-interest selfgovernance systems must prove themselves legitimate—that is, socially accepted and
expected—if they are to persist.”).
168 It is axiomatic that “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until
Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
169 More particularly, the McNollgast argument is that legislation reflects a victory by a
winning coalition and Congress needs to impose structures on agency administration—
including notice-and-comment requirements—to protect the interests of that coalition. See
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 481-82 (1989) (arguing that procedural requirements and structure “can provide
effective control over agency decisions”).
170 Terry M. Moe, Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 1148, 1154-55 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts
eds., 2013) (“The problem arises because the typical agency has its own policy preferences,
often different from those of Congress, and because it may be able to use the information
asymmetry built into their relationship—owing to its greater expertise—to go its own way in
policy.”).
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First, it is important to appreciate that the range of cases and the use of
experimental regulations envisioned in this Article will mostly arise in cases
where agencies possess broad authority without specific authorizations to act.171
In cases where regulatory agencies are specifically barred from proceeding in a
particular area, they cannot take action, experimental or otherwise. In cases
where they are specifically authorized to act, there is no cause for concern. The
most interesting cases are ones where the agency possesses broad authority, but
Congress has not specifically called on the agency to act.
The value of allowing administrative agencies some degree of “common-lawlike” authority is that they can address emerging issues as they arise rather than
await specific congressional authorization.172 In the Energy Star initiative, for
example, the EPA lacked authority to enact formal regulations, but possessed
broad authority to encourage energy efficiency.173 In that case, Congress
monitored the agency’s actions, providing budgetary authority for its efforts, and
ultimately endorsed the initiative by specifically authorizing it.174

171

As Jerry Mashaw has explained, the tradition of conferring broad authority to agencies
goes back to the early days of the Republic. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 290-91 (2012) (noting that like many statutes today, early statutes, such
as those establishing Departments of War and State in first Congress, provided “broad
delegations” of discretionary authority to administrative officers). The cynical take on this
practice is that Congress adopts general policies so that it can take credit for acting, but avoid
taking responsibility for specific results. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of
Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52
(1982). A more generous view is that Congress may not know specifically what it wants to
do, but agrees that the ability to act is important. See Glen O. Robinson, Commentary on
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Political Uses of
Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 485 (1989) (asserting that congressional
delegation of broad discretion to agencies can often “reflect the fact that coalition members
cannot agree on pertinent policy outcomes but can agree that delegating policymaking power
to an agency is preferable to legislative stymie”).
172 Sunstein interprets the canonical Chevron case in just this fashion, explaining that
“[o]perating as common law courts, agencies have, as they should, considerable power to
adapt statutory language to changing understandings and circumstances.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013,
1019 (1998).
173 Another challenge, not explored in this Article, is how to address the situation where
multiple agencies possess plausible claims to address an issue and seek to do so at the same
time. In the case of Energy Star, where the DOE had a claim to authority as well, the EPA
ultimately brought that agency into the program and the two agencies have collaborated on it
ever since. See Energy Star, supra note 1.
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 6294(a)(1) (2012). There is considerable debate and uncertainty on the
effectiveness of congressional oversight. See Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The
Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 107, 110 (2011) (“In fact, even today the extent to which Congress effectively oversees
agency activities remains unclear.”); id. at 111-12 (finding varying impact of congressional
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The McNollgast theory focuses on the concern that an agency will depart from
its envisioned direction by going rogue, but the theory ignores the risk that the
agency will depart from congressional intent by failing to act effectively.175
Recent scholarship suggests that these two goals—cabining agency discretion
and encouraging agency effectiveness—are in tension with one another.176 With
respect to the focus on structural safeguards to prevent unwanted agency action,
Professor Terry Moe suggested that “bureaucracies should tend to be less
burdened with structures that, in the American system, make it difficult for
agencies to do their jobs.”177 To that end, Moe criticizes the assumption—made
by McNollgast and others—that bureaucratic expertise and capacity can be
assumed. In contrast, invoking an article by Gailmard and Patty, Moe argues that
providing for a degree of agency discretion will lead to superior performance.178
Relying on after-the-fact review by Congress is far from perfect. In most
cases, the budget authorization process provides an important check on agency
action and can ensure the legitimacy of agency experiments. Nonetheless, there
may well be cases where information asymmetries between Congress and
administrative agencies allow some programs to remain under the radar.179 This
oversight, but noting that “congressional oversight and appropriations decisions have been
found to be important predictors of activity levels at the EPA and other agencies through the
late 1980s”).
175 Steve Croley offers this criticism of the McNollgast theory. Steven P. Croley, Public
Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 34 (2000) (“Another difficulty with the
McNollgast view is its implicit suggestion that agencies defy Congress—upset proper
legislative coalitions—only through action, not inaction.”).
176 Moe, supra note 170, at 1158 (“The McNollgast theory is about what Congress can do
to prevent runaway bureaucracy, which is an important issue. . . . The presumption seems to
be that, as long as agencies are under control and prevented from drifting, they will perform
effectively and constituents will get their benefits.”).
177 Id. at 1159.
178 Id. at 1170-71 (discussing Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil
Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 882-84
(2007)). Stated simply, Gailmard & Patty explain that “only those with a stake in policy can
be induced (by the limited instruments available) to become experts.” Gailmard & Patty,
supra, at 886. The same analysis can also apply to the case of how much discretion the White
House should allow to agencies to develop and implement regulatory initiatives. Gillian E.
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of
Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 434 (2009) (“Presidents may well be willing to forego
politicization or centralization and opt for a form of administration they can less easily control
if they believe that doing so will yield more effective performance.”).
179 On the McNollgast view, it was not necessarily information asymmetries that raised
this concern, but that a winning coalition that pushed the original legislation might fracture in
the face of a different outcome at the administrative agency, thereby undermining Congress’s
ability to push for its original policy preference after-the-fact. See McCubbins et al., supra
note 169, at 435-40. To the extent that this dynamic could take hold, however, it would apply
only in situations where the policy outcome was clearly zero-sum, with concrete winners and
losers. In many cases, including the case studies discussed in Part III, this premise does not
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concern should not be overstated, however, as like in the Energy Star case,
Congress plainly engages in after-the-fact oversight.180 Moreover, to the extent
that agencies believe that such oversight is possible, they may well internalize
congressional concerns and avoid controversy by declining to act outside of their
mandates.181
2.

Compliance with Traditional Administrative Law Norms

For regulatory initiatives managed by private bodies (or even for public
agencies acting outside formal processes), there is a basic question as to whether
they comply with traditional administrative law norms. With respect to standard
setting, the federal government has long required that “official” standard setting
bodies—that is, those developing voluntary consensus standards used or
supported by the government—must operate based on a set of norms related to
openness and transparency. In particular, the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) has explained that such bodies should adhere to the following:
(1) openness, (2) balance of interest, (3) due process, (4) a review/appeals
process, and (5) a commitment to developing consensus.182 By following these
principles, the OMB suggests, such bodies can develop legitimacy.183 Similarly,
when governments rely on third party certification regimes, the best practice is
to ensure that they operate openly and transparently.184

hold. A more powerful reason to doubt the ability of Congress to engage in after-the-fact
review is that its practice of establishing multiple agencies with oversight jurisdiction—
thereby creating a “multiplicity of legislative principals”—can undermine “the control they
have collectively over a bureaucratic agent.” Sean Gailmard, Multiple Principals and
Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 21 J. THEORETICAL POL. 161, 181 (2009).
180 Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95, 125-27 (2014) (contending oversight of FTC in early- and late-1970s
influenced agency behavior).
181 Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW 333, 335 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (“A rational
agency might prefer to maintain rigid control over existing jurisdiction or avoid entering into
regulatory domains that will prove especially controversial . . . .”); id. at 336 (explaining
“under-reaching” by agencies on ground that they might well prefer to “maximize autonomy
instead of regulatory authority”).
182
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-119,
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS
STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 16 (2014), https://www.white
house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A119/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_
22.pdf [https://perma.cc/92RE-UE2H].
183 Id. at 14-16.
184 LESLEY K. MCCALLISTER, THIRD-PARTY PROGRAMS TO ASSESS REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE (PRELIMINARY DRAFT) 47 (2012) https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Draft-Report-on-Third-Party-Programs-to-Assess-Regulatory-Compliance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2AS4-ELKG] (highlighting importance of transparency and accountability
to protect public confidence in such third-party programs); see Daniel C. Esty, Good
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As a foundational matter, the values of due process—namely, notice and the
opportunity to be heard—are fundamental to the administrative state. To be
successful, experimental regulatory programs must take these values
seriously.185 Similarly, the administrative law tradition of providing reasoned
justifications for decisions—even if not subject to judicial review—is a healthy
practice for public agencies and private entities developing new regulatory
initiatives.186 By adhering to such norms, both public agencies and private
entities can earn legitimacy.
For private entities, membership structure is a critical step to building
legitimacy.187 Initially, when the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever founded the
MSC program, it was criticized as tilted toward industry and insufficiently
transparent and participatory.188 Responding to these criticisms, the MSC
became an independent non-profit organization in 1998 and took governance
issues very seriously, instituting requirements that “enhance[d] participation,
representation, and transparency.”189 Moreover, in 2001, after further
governance review, the MSC instituted a series of measures to facilitate its
responsiveness to a range of stakeholders, including the addition of a technical
advisory board, a stakeholder council, and national and regional working
groups.190

Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J.
1490, 1527-37 (2006) (setting out best practices for governance and asserting that “a
procedurally sophisticated rulemaking process promotes political debate and decisionmaking
based on reasoned analysis and, thus, enhances deliberative legitimacy”).
185 For discussions of this point, see McAllister, supra note 19, at 404 (“The development
of program rules and guidance [of a private regulatory regime] should include public notice
and participation.”); Weiser, supra note 35, at 577 (calling for such experimental regulatory
programs to adopt “commitment to transparency, open participation (at least on specified
terms), [and] periodic exit rights for members”).
186 The classic administrative law case on point is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring agency to
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”).
187 To develop that credibility, as explained by Ofcom, the organization must include the
right mix of membership. See OFFICE OF COMM’CNS, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO
ADOPT SELF- OR CO-REGULATION § 4.3(h), 12 (2008) (U.K.), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/
__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/41806/condoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMN8-67CE] (considering
“a system involving a mixture of independent lay and industry members [to] be appropriate
in both the [self-regulatory] scheme’s governing body and further operating committees” and
necessary to garner respect of stakeholder groups).
188 Martijn W. Scheltema, Assessing Effectiveness of International Private Regulation in
the CSR Arena, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 310-11 (2014).
189 Id.
190 Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Accountability Arrangements in Non-State Standards
Organizations: Instrumental Design and Imitation, 15 ORG. 563, 572 (2008). The MSC is still
led by a self-perpetuating board of trustees. Id.
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The Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”),191 which provided the basic model
for the MSC, uses a very sophisticated governance structure and enjoys a
competitive advantage on that account.192 Under the FSC’s charter, social,
economic, and environmental concerns have equal weight.193 In the face of
adopting stricter standards than some industry participants believed appropriate,
industry interests sought to establish rival certification programs.194 Those
programs, however, were forced to adjust their governance models “to accept
some degree of scrutiny from and answerability to outside stakeholders” in order
to compete with “FSC for legitimacy and rule-making authority.”195 This
development suggests that governance norms around transparency,
participation, and accountability are becoming de rigeur for trusted multistakeholder organizations.196 Ideally, such safeguards can limit the risk of public
choice pressures and industry capture in multi-stakeholder organizations.197
Even with diverse membership, multi-stakeholder organizations must take
affirmative steps to address the “[c]oncerns about the uneven capacity of
191 Like the MSC, the FSC focuses on sustainability, articulating its mission as providing
principles and criteria for “environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically
viable forest management.” The 10 FSC Principles, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL https://ic.
fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc-certification/principles-criteria/fscs-10-principles [https://perma.cc/W
79D-S4PY] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
192 Scheltema, supra note 188, at 311.
193 Id. (“[The FSC] established a tripartite governance structure composed of social,
environmental, and economic chambers which have equal voting rights. In each chamber
there are north and south sub chambers with equal voting rights regardless of the number of
members.”); see Meidinger, supra note 83, at 53 (“The FSC’s international governing body,
the General Assembly, is constituted of three chambers—economic, social and
environmental—with equal voting power. These chambers are further divided into Northern
(developed country) and Southern (developing country) sub-chambers, each also holding
equal decisional power . . . .”).
194 Gulbrandsen, supra note 190, at 572.
195 Id. at 572; see Meidinger, supra note 83, at 55 (noting that FSC rival, Sustainable
Forestry Initiative, “has since gone through numerous other iterations, gradually getting
stronger and more detailed, and eventually being placed under the control of a nominally
independent multi-stakeholder board”).
196 See Gulbrandsen, supra note 190, at 575 (making this argument and concluding that
“accountability structures are most developed in FSC and MSC, whereas certification
proceedings in industry-dominated schemes tend to be less demanding, transparent and open
to outside stakeholders”); Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How
Could It Be Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 513, 517 (2008) (“Most programs now provide
for multi-stakeholder participation, notice-and-comment processes for rulemaking and
adjudication, public responses to comments and explanation of decisions, . . . and similar
practices characterizing modern administrative regulation.”); see also Lytton, supra note 143,
at 547 (explaining how UL built up “its reputation for trustworthiness through transparency”).
197 In praising such structures, one commentator went so far as to suggest that they are
resistant to such practices and “more directly democratic” than traditional regulatory
institutions. Roberts, supra note 148, at 140.
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different stakeholders to participate.”198 To be sure, this concern is equally
applicable to traditional administrative processes conducted by public
agencies.199 With respect to providing voices to different groups, the leaders of
multi-stakeholder processes should be aware that not all groups are equally well
positioned to participate and there are measures—such as the ones taken by the
FSC200—that can ensure all perspectives are heard before important decisions
are made. Given that such measures may well require funding those who cannot
otherwise participate, this challenge threatens to become an Achilles heel for
any multi-stakeholder organization.
C.

Accountability

To ensure that a regulatory regime is successful, it must hold regulated firms
accountable. For agencies or entities that lack the tools to punish noncompliance with a regulatory standard, the risk is that opportunistic behavior,
whether cheating on the rule or free-riding by not making the investments
necessary for full compliance, will become the norm. As sociological studies
show, where firms believe that compliance is the norm, they are far more likely
to comply; by contrast, the belief that others are cheating encourages non-

198

Nick Doty & Deidre K. Mulligan, Internet Multistakeholder Processes and TechnoPolicy Standards, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 135, 163, 181 (2013) (examining multistakeholder effort on internet privacy and noting need for “additional measures to ensure
effective participation by diverse stakeholders”); see Waz & Weiser, supra note 63, at 344
(“With greater openness to members, [multistakeholder] bodies must . . . minimize the risk of
forum-packing, which can become a challenge when an organization’s ground rules permit
disproportionate representation that may introduce dimensions of politics into its process.”).
199 Lytton, supra note 143, at 569 (noting private entity certification efforts that “compare
favorably in terms of participation, transparency, and accountability with notice-andcomment rulemaking”); Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 463, 464 (2012) (“Empirical evidence indicates that industry interests
dominate the rulemaking process in a number of important areas of social regulation, with no
public interest representation at all in many rulemakings.”); Wendy Wagner, Katherine
Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic
Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 119, 152 (2011) (examining “interest group
participation and influence during three stages of the rulemaking process for one set of highly
technical rules promulgated by EPA” and concluding that “imbalanced participation” from
industry and public interest groups is prevalent).
200 Meidinger, supra note 196, at 527 (noting that FSC tried to “provide resources and
venues” to allow less-endowed interests to join in discussions).
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compliance.201 Consequently, a common response to potential cheating is to
require auditing or certification of the regulated standard of conduct.202
As this Section discusses, there are a range of different auditing, certification,
and oversight regimes to encourage compliance. For self-regulatory initiatives,
it is often the case that “the presence or absence of public monitoring is
critical.”203 And the design of such regimes matters. In the best of cases,
effective oversight can ensure vigilant compliance, leveraging public disclosure
as a tool and incentive.204 In the worst cases, the compliance regime encourages
check-the-box thinking and conduct that misleads the public as to whether a firm
is meaningfully compliant.205
A fundamental challenge for private regimes that rely on outside oversight is
the potential conflict of interest facing auditors and certification bodies. As one
commentator explained, the goal of such programs is for the “certifier” to
operate as a “trustworthy expert who can verify for outsiders that a firm is
performing to [a] standard” of conduct and be analogous to a hearing officer or
government inspector.206 The big difference and challenge is that auditors and
certification bodies are selected and paid for by the regulated firm. When
structured well, such as the MSC,207 a successful program can operate
effectively and manage the potential conflicts of interest, ensure sufficient
transparency, and promote accountability.208 In other cases, however, the

201 See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 341-43
(2001) (“In sum, individuals behave like amoral calculators posited by the conventional
theory only when they believe that others are cheaters; if they believe that others are morally
motivated to comply, they reciprocate by complying in turn, whether or not they believe that
they could profitably evade.”).
202 But see id. at 343 (“But because stepped up enforcement efforts supply no assurance
that citizens can trust others to pay their taxes, they are unlikely to promote the reciprocal
cooperation necessary to sustain high compliance levels.”).
203 Weiser, supra note 35, at 552; see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 16, at 33 (noting
salutary effect of oversight and “claim[ing] that business actors are likely to put forward a self
that they, the regulator and the researcher observing them, are all likely to view as their
socially responsible self”); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More
Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361,
387 (2010) (concluding that self-regulation without oversight can be abused by poor
compliers “as window dressing” and that threat of punishment in background is healthy).
204 McAllister, supra note 19, at 314.
205 Friederike Albersmeier et al., The Reliability of Third-Party Certification in the Food
Chain: From Checklists to Risk-Oriented Auditing, 20 FOOD CONTROL 927, 928-30 (2009)
(explaining risk-assessment-based auditing versus checklist-based auditing); see Alexia
Brunet Marks, A New Governance Recipe for Food Safety Regulation, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI.
L.J. 907, 960-61 (2016) (discussing this concern in context of food safety regulation).
206 E.g., Meidinger, supra note 8, at 267.
207 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
208 In statutory regimes that call for third-party audits, Congress generally institutes
requirements for managing conflict of interest concerns, including oversight of those charged
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potential for conflicts of interest and the need to develop safeguards against them
is neglected.209 In short, it is crucial that programs ensure effective oversight lest
participants begin to see compliance as optional and non-compliance as the
norm.210
The risks to initiatives without strong safeguards against cheating underscores
the importance of a robust accreditation regime. As for the MSC case discussed
above, formally accredited bodies oversee and certify the results of purportedly
independent auditors.211 To guide such oversight, the International Organization
for Standardization (“ISO”) has developed a standardized approach to
“conformity assessment,”212 explaining the two key elements of this model:
(1) certification and (2) accreditation.213 Notably, the ultimate authority (say, a
governmental agency like the EPA) selects the accreditation body (or bodies) to
accredit responsible auditors and to certify audits as a means of ensuring
compliance with the regulatory regime.214 With an independent accreditation

with accrediting the auditors. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 205, at 936-40 (discussing Food
Safety Modernization Act’s third party auditing regime); McAllister, supra note 19, at 33538 (same).
209 Notably, in some programs, there is “little transparency in the inspection activities of
the auditors hired by commercial buyers to check on their suppliers.” Lesley K. McAllister,
Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 34 (2012). In such cases, where
third-party auditors are arranged for and paid for by the regulated firm with little oversight,
the relationship is “rife with potential for abuse.” Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & LiWen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 334
(2008).
210 See OFFICE OF COMMC’N, supra note 35, at 22 (emphasizing importance of “openness
and transparency in operation, and a degree of public accountability in relation to the scheme’s
performance”); Julien Etienne, Compliance Theory: A Goal Framing Approach, 33 LAW &
POL’Y 305, 316 (2011) (explaining how perceptions of institutional environment shape
attitudes toward compliance).
211 See McAllister, supra note 209, at 2 (“With third-party verification, regulated entities
are required to contract with a ‘verifier’ or ‘verification body’ to make a regulatory
compliance determination.”).
212 The American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) is recognized by ISO as the
“official U.S. representative.” About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST.,
https://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview?menuid=1 [https://perma.cc/WWA5NC6P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). ANSI defines “conformity assessment” as the
“demonstration that specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person, or
body are fulfilled.” AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., UNITED STATES CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT
PRINCIPLES 3, 5 (3d ed. 2007), https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/News%20and%20
Publications/Brochures/USCAP%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GYR-6XY9].
213 For a discussion of conformity assessment, see McAllister, supra note 19, at 310-12
(explaining development of standardized conformity assessment and detailing different forms
of assessment, including testing, inspection, certification, and accreditation).
214 See id. at 312 (“Accreditation bodies may be public or private entities, and some
countries have one or more private accreditation bodies in addition to or instead of a national
accreditation body. Accreditation bodies, in turn, are often members of either the International
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body in place, auditors cannot take for granted that pleasing the regulated firm
is their only obligation (other than professional norms); rather, they must
consider whether their work will be accepted and whether they can maintain
their accreditation.215 Moreover, making the certification decision and firm
performance data public provides both an incentive for firm improvement as
well as a basis for other outside parties to scrutinize the certification decision.216
The value of an effective accreditation system is underscored by the
experience of the Energy Star program. In the early 1990s, the EPA, in an
innovative regulatory experiment, developed a voluntary program for
electronics manufacturers to label their programs with a “certification mark”
(Energy Star) that signaled that the products were energy efficient.217 On a
number of levels, the program has succeeded, “sav[ing] American families and
businesses 503 billion kWh of energy and $34 billion on their energy bills in
2015 alone” and catalyzing the “purchase [of] more than 300 million Energy
Star certified products in 2015.”218 For consumers, the brand is both familiar
(“seventy-six percent of households reported a high understanding of the
ENERGY STAR label in 2015”)219 and powerful (fifty-two percent of
consumers in non-high-publicity areas in 2015 reported that they were “‘very
much’ influenced by the label after recognizing it and purchasing an ENERGY
STAR-labeled product”).220 Finally, building on this model and working with

Accreditation Forum (IAF) or the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation
(ILAC), which require adherence to international standards for accreditation bodies and use a
system of peer evaluation to assess accreditation bodies for membership.” (footnote omitted)).
215 See id. (explaining that objective of independent accreditation “is that conformity
assessment bodies accredited by member accreditation bodies will be recognized as
competent in multiple jurisdictions and markets”).
216 See Meidinger, supra note 83, at 71-73 (noting that FSC reviews “accreditation
decisions of certifiers, with the option of suspending or revoking their status as certifiers if
problems occur,” and uses transparency of certification proceedings as check on certifiers).
217 See Fla. Citrus Comm’n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 499 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (“A
certification mark is a special creature created for a purpose uniquely different from that of
an ordinary service mark or trademark.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 11 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
218 About ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR, (footnote omitted) https://www.energystar.gov/
about [https://perma.cc/SYG6-3C8W] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
219 EPA OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, CLIMATE PROTECTION P’SHIPS DIV., NATIONAL
AWARENESS OF ENERGY STAR FOR 2015: ANALYSIS OF 2015 CEE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ES1 (2015) https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.downloadfile&file=F8426
7790DF5B5F22EB9D715BC7BEC4F2E6F21C078AD0D8DB716916D20CB04C3778CC4
0ABE8B9DBF508BE77DAD9A753D5EAA2CFC510D5530702AC176F23ACA67F51939
211384A8256F097182F6234B80CC51C3BB639D51552DAB56D4A545B4EC28CA75636
445B36DBC1EBCFB00613B4901FD9F2DFC20B85E0A8A1CF8C266ED6C552155DB4A
2FA9F326381FE0D89F4D1F&app_code=publications&env_name=other [https://perma.cc/
6KUD-2ERF].
220 Id. at 21.
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the EPA, other countries, including Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan, as well
as the European Union, adopted the Energy Star program for certain products.221
For most of its history, the Energy Star program relied on manufacturers to
self-declare compliance, with no requirement for independent third-party
certification and very limited oversight to guard against false reporting.222 After
a Consumer Reports analysis223 and a Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) investigation highlighted the flaws of this approach, including a GAO
audit that reported that fifteen out of twenty non-qualifying products submitted
for review were accepted by the EPA,224 the EPA agreed to change the structure
of the program.225 Energy Star labeling now requires testing in an accredited
laboratory and certified results (by an accredited certification body) that are sent
to the EPA.226 Moreover, Energy Star audits product certifications to ensure that
they are being managed properly and the accreditation system now requires the
accreditation bodies to conduct periodic assessments of the certification bodies
they oversee.227 Applications for the Energy Star label have not fallen off despite
the rising compliance costs, signaling the program’s value.228

221 ENERGY STAR International Partners, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/
index.cfm?c=partners.intl_implementation [https://perma.cc/2BLT-DJHW] (last visited
Nov. 18, 2017).
222 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-470, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM: COVERT
TESTING SHOWS THE ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS VULNERABLE TO
FRAUD AND ABUSE 6 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10470.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DX9B-H6ZR].
223 See id. at 7 (“[A]n October 2008 issue of Consumer Reports detailed further problems
[with the Energy Star certification program], including lax qualifying standards, federal
testing procedures that were outpaced by current technology, and reliance on industry selfpolicing . . . without evidence of the effectiveness of that approach.”); Ryan Davis, ‘Energy
Star’ Claims May Be Misleading: Study, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2008), https://www.law360.com/
articles/69886 (“Consumer Reports also faulted the program for allowing companies to selfcertify that their products comply with the standards, since the EPA does not test any products
itself. As a result, there is no independent verification of what the manufacturers report.”).
224 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 222, at 8; see id. at 17 (“Our ability
to obtain product certifications with unverified test results illustrates the need for, at a
minimum, some level of third-party testing for the program to be one of certification versus
self-certification.”).
225 Memorandum from Cathy Zoi, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, & Gina
McCarthy, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Steven Chu, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, & Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on Building a Stronger Energy
Star Program para. 2 (Apr. 2, 2010), https://www.energystar.gov/ia/news/downloads/Joint_
Letter_with_DOE_EPA_Building_a_Stronger_Energy_Star_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ES7Y-GB6C].
226 Id. paras. 3-9 (explaining changes in program away from self-certification towards
independent testing); see McCallister, supra note 209, at 19.
227 MCCALLISTER, supra note 184, at 49.
228 Id. at 53.
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The Administrative Conference of the United States has studied the use of
third-party certification regimes and recommends that agencies carefully
“evaluate whether sufficient incentives exist or can be created to attract the
participation of regulated entities in the third-party program.”229 As examples of
such incentives, it mentions an “exemption from a governmental fee” and the
ability to satisfy multi-jurisdictional regulatory requirements “through a single
third-party conformity assessment.”230 The Administrative Conference
concluded, morever, that when an agency relies on third-party evaluators, it “has
a duty to exercise oversight to ensure that the third-party is fulfilling its
regulatory purpose.”231 Similarly, with respect to private regulatory initiatives,
the ISEAL Alliance works with “multi-stakeholder sustainability standards and
accreditation bodies that demonstrate their ability to meet the ISEAL Codes of
Good Practice and accompanying requirements, and commit to learning and
improving,” enabling efforts like the MSC to increase their effectiveness.232
In general, private regulation efforts are unlikely to succeed without the
backing of effective public oversight to address the threat of opportunist
behavior by companies claiming compliance, but disregarding relevant
requirements.233 This general rule, however, gives way to important

229

ACUS Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess
Regulatory Compliance, 78 Fed. Reg. 2941, 2942 (Jan. 15, 2013).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 2943.
232 About Us, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/
9PQE-HPM8] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in
Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 67, 95-96 (2011) (praising role of ISEAL Alliance).
233 See Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market SelfRegulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59
BUS. LAW. 1347, 1347 (2004) (“[I]ndustry self-regulation subject to SEC supervision
generally has been effective in its major applications when the Commission has been willing
to threaten or actually use its regulatory authority to create incentives for securities industry
self-regulation.”); Jodi L. Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or
“Bad Moon,” 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (2013) (finding that “selfregulation works best when it is not really self-regulation at all, but when it constitutes
regulated organizations as more governable institutions within a robust regulatory regime”).
As one study of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program found:
Our research exposes the difficulty in establishing and maintaining industry selfregulation. Responsible Care has operated up to now without explicit sanctions for
malfeasance. As a result, our data suggest, it has fallen victim to enough opportunism
that it includes a disproportionate number of poor performers, and its members do not
improve faster than nonmembers.
Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 713 (2000). For an
economic modeling of this concept, see Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen
M. Hagerty, Self-Regulation and Government Oversight, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 687, 700
(2005) (concluding that “[o]versight allows the government to threaten enforcement without
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exceptions.234 First off, as in the MSC case, a purely private regulatory regime
that is viewed as credible and develops a successful brand in the marketplace
can influence industry behavior by using a meaningful certification regime.235
Second, either a private or a public sector effort can be successful if industry
participants believe that compliance is valuable and may well sway regulatory
or legal authorities by operating as a safe harbor in practice (such as with BITAG
and the Copyright Alliance).236 Finally, as in the FTC’s oversight of online
privacy, the adoption of either a private regulatory standard or compliance with
best practices developed by a governmental agency may take hold as ways to
avoid more stringent governmental regulation.237 Indeed, some commentators
have argued that some private certification efforts outperform government ones
by effectively resisting public choice pressures—with the aid of empowered
members (such as the role of insurance companies in UL who insist on
vigilance)—that would undermine their reliability.238

actually undertaking any” and that threat raises level of compliance by self-regulatory bodies).
234 Elinor Ostrom has identified the core conditions necessary for such exceptions. See
Elinor Ostrom, A Long Polycentric Journey, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1, 6 (2010) (noting
importance of level of trust, reliable data, effective decision-monitoring, and ability to adapt,
and concluding that “individuals facing [collective action problems] do not always need an
external authority” to solve them).
235 See King & Lenox, supra note 233, at 713 (noting that “explicit sanctions administered
by informed outsiders may be needed to avoid opportunism within an industry self-regulatory
scheme” and suggesting that third-party certifiers and publicizing firm performance
information can discipline industry behavior); Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 166 (“Private
certification and labeling systems directed at consumers are a form of large-scale private
ordering that may be able to overcome . . . collective action problems . . . .”). There are cases
where public regulation can serve to develop a self-enforcing norm—such as banning
smoking—even where there is no formal enforcement of the rule. See Michael J. Licari,
Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory Success Without Enforcement, in POLITICS, POLICY,
AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 276, 289
(George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2005). This dynamic could conceivably take
hold in certain private initiatives as well. See id. (finding that using signaled information,
rather than coercion, may yield successful policies and noting that this “suggests that other,
nonregulatory agencies can play an important role in implementation of regulation”).
236
See supra notes 61, 69-76.
237 Meidinger, supra note 83, at 59 (“[T]he threat of increased governmental regulation in
the absence of effective non-governmental regulation has sometimes been a background
factor in the acceptance of certification.”); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations,
Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth
to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 31, 48 (2008) (explaining nuclear power
industry’s creation of successful self-regulatory initiative); Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at
137 (“Corporations have incentives to use private governance to mollify stakeholder concerns
and to displace more stringent government regulation, and it would be surprising if some
private efforts do not have these effects.”).
238 Lytton, supra note 143, at 560-61.
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Evaluating the Challenges of Experimentation and Policy
Entrepreneurship

As highlighted above and developed further in Part IV, a prerequisite to
experimentation and departing from traditional models is overcoming
bureaucratic inertia. As explained in this Section, it is possible that
experimentation spurred by entrepreneurial leadership could make things
worse—if applied to programs and processes that are working reasonably well.
In this Section, I discuss five types of risks of departing from a traditional model:
(1) taking policy in a lawless (or even dangerous) direction, (2) undermining a
good (even if imperfect) program, (3) evading public input and transparency,
(4) discouraging better practice by promoting best practice, and (5) enabling
industry capture.
A bureaucratic system is designed to ensure regularity and consistency in
decisionmaking. Max Weber, who evaluated the emerging bureaucratic state in
the early 1900s, identified this basic characteristic and described how it
operated.239 As Professor Gillian Metzger explained, Weberian bureaucracy
exists in today’s federal government as “major federal agencies are generally
hierarchically organized and staffed substantially by career public servants with
removal protection.”240 Consequently, once a program is designed and once
processes are instituted, bureaucratic inertia serves the purpose of protecting the
basics of the program.
A basic objection to the idea that agencies can earn regulatory authority
through entrepreneurial initiatives is that this model will undermine effective
public administration. In the strongest version of this concern, entrepreneurial
leaders in government and experimentation in regulatory programs provide
flexibility to governmental leaders that is abused.241 Viewed against this
concern, bureaucratic inertia and regular processes provide bulwarks against
abuse and corruption.242 In the case of President Trump, for example, some have

239 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 95659 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968). In line with
Weber’s analysis, Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson explained that bureaucracy serves the
purpose of “promot[ing] probity in mission, responsiveness, and [consistent]
communication.” Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction
Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 325 (1999).
240 Gillian B. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1848
(2015).
241 On this view, for example, J. Edgar Hoover’s entrepreneurial leadership takes the form
of abusing his position. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE EXCELLENCE 1 (2015),
https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/2015_ResponsiveExcellence.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z87-W5J3] (“J. Edgar Hoover is the archetypical evil
regulator because he sought to be transformative by abusing arbitrary power.”).
242 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 540-41 (2015) (explaining how civil servants “are well positioned to push back on
any tendency agency leaders might have to skirt laws and promote hyperpartisan interests”).
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suggested that bureaucratic inertia is a powerful force that will minimize the
impact of dangerous policies.243
The concern about making changes for the sake of change or making
misguided changes is well taken. As a foundational principle, those evaluating
changes to existing programs should remember that “the best is the enemy of the
good.”244 For a regulatory program that works well enough, but could be
improved, experimentation and innovation might make matters worse.
Emphasizing this point, commentators like Professor Jill Lepore have reacted to
Professor Clayton Christensen’s high praise for innovation with strong criticism;
as Lepore puts it, the core weakness of Christensen’s praise of innovation is that
“[t]ransfixed by change, it’s blind to continuity.”245
Skeptics of innovation highlight the risk that governmental leaders will pursue
change and innovation for its own sake, fail to know what they do not know, and
undermine well-functioning programs in the process.246 Such concerns are
particularly poignant where the risks of failure—which can arise when departing
from traditional processes, such as those involved in ensuring nuclear safety
regulation—are greatest. In such contexts, my critique of government’s
undervaluing the impact of false negatives on account of the inertial bias against
experimentation and innovation does not apply with the same force.247 Indeed,
some regulatory reforms later connected to the financial crisis were criticized on
this very ground,248 in line with the conventional defense of bureaucratic inertia
“as a brake on ill-considered adaptations.”249

243 See, e.g, Leon Neyfakh, Can the “Secret Government” Save Us?, SLATE (Nov. 14,
2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/can_the_secret_go
vernment_save_us_from_donald_trump.html [https://perma.cc/Z8YQ-UU9K].
244 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716 (Angela Partington ed., rev. 4th ed.
1996) (translating “[l]e mieux est l’ennemi du bien” to mean “[t]he best is the enemy of the
good”).
245 Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine, NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014, at 30, 36. But see
Drake Bennett, Clayton Christensen Responds to New Yorker Takedown of ‘Disruptive
Innovation,’ BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 21, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-06-20/clayton-christensen-responds-to-new-yorker-takedown-of-disrupt
ive-innovation (interviewing Clayton Christensen and discussing Jillian Lepore’s critique of
Christensen’s work).
246 This concern, about elected or appointed officials vis-à-vis the professional
bureaucracy, goes back to Weber. See Thomas H. Hammond, Veto Points, Policy Preferences,
and Bureaucracy in Democratic Systems, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS:
FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY, supra note 235, at 73, 74 (noting
advantages of bureaucracy over political leaders).
247 See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2014)
(stating that “high reliability theory forbids trial-and-error learning because it is simply too
risky that errors will arise”).
248 See Weiser, supra note 35, at 573 (discussing SEC decision to change capital
requirements for investment banks).
249 Klein, supra note 111, at 9.
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As explained above, we are moving into an age where networks, more than
hierarchies, can better coordinate and influence behavior and adapt to changing
circumstances.250 As such, it is important to take neither a “blind obedience to
disruption [nor] blind obedience to continuity.”251 Skeptics of innovation may
be inclined to defend status-quo approaches and doubt calls for experimentation,
but as discussed above with respect to the development of the healthcare.gov
website,252 the use of traditional approaches in the midst of changing
circumstances can have disastrous results.
Second, some criticize experimental regulatory strategies as operating outside
of traditional administrative law norms. Professor Jody Freeman highlighted this
concern, recommending that “standard-setting groups should adhere to at least
some internal procedural rules designed to promote information disclosure,
reasoned decision making, and fairness.”253 Building on this suggestion,
Freeman argues that “privatization can be a means of ‘publicization,’ through
which private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public
goals.”254 When following the recommendations above, this vision can be
realized. Where, however, private regulatory models (or agencies developing
best practices outside of rulemaking or adjudication) fail to do so, Freeman’s
cautionary concern is well taken.
Third, the promotion of best practices, where an agency decides to do so,
raises notable risks. Most significantly, government-promoted best practices can
lead to a “ritual of comfort,” where companies become complacent by following
guidelines that are not updated appropriately.255 As Professor Michael Power
describes, such rituals exist when companies follow outdated or useless
procedures to give the appearance of accountability or order without advancing
any useful purpose.256 In the cybersecurity context, the risk of a check-the-box
compliance mentality is substantial, as “enhancing the cybersecurity posture of
a system—and by extension the organization in which it is embedded—must be
understood as an ongoing process rather than something that can be done once

250 See JOHN HAGEL III & JOHN SEELY BROWN, INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: CREATING
SMARTER ORGANIZATIONS TO SCALE LEARNING 2 (2013), http://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-usen/topics/innovation/institutional-innovation.html [https://perma.cc/W3JG-R5P3] (download
report from side-menu) (calling for “‘scalable learning’ with the goal of creating smarter
institutions that can thrive in a world of exponential change”).
251 Greg Satell, Let’s Stop Arguing About Whether Disruption Is Good or Bad, HARV. BUS.
REV. (May 21, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/lets-stop-arguing-about-whether-disruption-isgood-or-bad [https://perma.cc/YY8V-AXT6].
252 See supra notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
253 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 643
(2000).
254 Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1285 (2003).
255 See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 96 (1997).
256 Id.
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and then forgotten.”257 Citing such concerns, some commentators are critical of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) Cybersecurity
Framework.258 Viewed more generally, this concern is why governmentconvened efforts should not settle for a traditional “best practices” model; rather,
they should insist on building a framework and capability to drive continuously
developing “better practice.”
Finally, experimental regulatory programs could enable the evasion of stricter
requirements and provide an ineffective form of oversight. The success of the
LEED standard and the MSC certification model over industry opposition
suggests otherwise, underscoring that “public choice” concerns do not always
lurk behind such models.259 Nonetheless, there is a risk that such initiatives could
provide the appearance, but not the reality, of regulatory oversight. The critical
question, however, is whether the public choice risks in experimental contexts
are necessarily greater than those in traditional programs. If experimental
programs are designed to engage a wide range of stakeholders, they may well be
less susceptible to such risks.
III. CASE STUDIES OF EXPERIMENTAL REGULATION AND EARNED
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Governmental oversight of emerging technologies can take different forms.
One theme that runs through each of the case studies discussed in this Part is that
there are potentially significant benefits from building cooperation, facilitating
coordination, and elevating the level of trust in an entire sector that comes from
a shared commitment to a defined level of responsible behavior.260 Catalyzing
those benefits, however, requires entrepreneurial leadership and appropriate
incentives to overcome the collective action problem. In the first three case

257 COMM. ON DEVELOPING A CYBERSECURITY PRIMER ET AL., AT THE NEXUS OF
CYBERSECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 2-3 (David Clark,
Thomas Berson & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2014).
258 See, e.g., Robert Gyenes, A Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework Is Unworkable—
Government Must Crack the Whip, 14 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 293, 307-10 (2014) (stating that
the Framework fails to establish (1) sufficiently clear compliance obligations, (2) adequate
incentives for systems improvement, (3) novel practices that market could not otherwise
achieve on its own, and (4) appropriate cost analysis).
259 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 89, at 568 (providing example of public choice
behavior as when “[p]rivate interest groups lobby for regulatory policies that advance the
material well-being of their members—at best without regard to whether these policies serve
the larger public interest, and often with the precise object of profiting at the expense of the
public or some competing group”).
260 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory
State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 580-81 (2010) (commenting that “[m]uch of the vaunted ‘New
Economy’ turns out to be a coordination economy” and calling for examination of how
regulatory agencies can facilitate coordination).
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studies, entrepreneurial leaders successfully developed such efforts; in the fourth
study, HHS has, thus far, largely failed to do so.
A.

The LEED Building Standard

For a case study of private regulation influencing industry behavior, consider
the impact of the LEED building standards.261 To appreciate its impact (and in a
“perverse sign of its expanding influence”), some industry groups are concerned
about its demanding requirements and are resorting to the political process to
ban any reference to the standard, with Mississippi having already enacted such
a law.262 Despite such efforts, the LEED standard is now the leading one for
green buildings and has helped grow that sector to forty-five percent of new
institutional construction.263
The now-familiar LEED certification is administered by the USGBC and
allows builders to certify compliance at different levels of stringency (Platinum,
Gold, Silver, and Bronze), with 2.2 million square feet certified daily.264 LEED’s
significance is such that, as one commentator put it, “[i]ndustry groups now
lobby the USGBC regarding the content of LEED standards in ways that might
have been directed at Congress or the [EPA] two decades ago.”265 Initially, the
Council’s only mandate was its moral authority to encourage better practice.
Today, there are both sticks (a number of municipalities have adopted rules for

261

See generally LEED, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://new.usgbc.org/leed
[https://perma.cc/XGP5-KXGH] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
262 Emily Badger, Why Are Some States Trying to Ban LEED Green Building Standards?,
CITY LAB (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/design/2013/08/why-are-some-statestrying-ban-leed-green-building-standards/6691 [https://perma.cc/7AB9-F436]. The efforts to
ban LEED, pushed by some industry groups, stem from the concern that the USGBC has shut
“out many stakeholders, [is] unbalanced in its committee representation and lack[s]
transparency.” Craig Silvertooth, Commentary: More Voices Need to Be Heard When Setting
Green Standards, WASH. POST (July 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
capitalbusiness/commentary-more-voices-need-to-be-heard-when-setting-green-standards/
2013/07/19/4fd8200a-ed63-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7R8JHP3Z]. Supporters of the LEED standard counter that the real issue is the timber industry’s
opposition to stricter standards of conduct, notably, the FSC. See supra notes 191-200 and
accompanying text; see also Badger, supra (claiming that FSC “demands costlier and more
sustainable practices” in order to “pass off fundamentally status quo, barely legal forestry
practices as green and sustainable”).
263 See The Business Case for Green Building, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL (Feb. 10,
2015), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/business-case-green-building [https://perma.cc/DX4LVTNP]. For a favorable assessment of the LEED standard, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CERTIFIABLY SUSTAINABLE? THE ROLE OF THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS 47-65
(2010).
264 LEED, supra note 261.
265 Vandenbergh, supra note 64, at 154.
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requiring LEED certification)266 and carrots (a number of state governments, as
well as the federal government, have adopted incentive programs in this area)267
to encourage compliance.
The LEED standard provides an overall structure for evaluating energy and
environmental impact. It is structured around a 110-point scale, across eight
credit categories: Energy and Atmosphere, Indoor Environmental Quality,
Innovation in Design, Location and Transportation, Materials and Resources,
Regional Priority, Sustainable Sites, and Water Efficiency.268 The USGBC
continues to refine this system through regular notice-and-comment
opportunities, thereby ensuring that new technologies are captured and
encouraged.269 With respect to oversight, the Council has delegated the
certification process to the Green Building Council Institute (“GBCI”), which
accredits green building professionals.270 Those professionals can work with
builders to submit an application for LEED certification.271 For applications that
do not meet the minimum program requirements, the GBCI rejects the
application. If the GBCI later learns of any inaccurate information that supported

266 See Michael T. Durham, Counsel’s Role in Sustainable Solutions: Pay Now or Pay
Later, 31 STRATEGIC PLAN. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T 19, 31 (2012).
267 Rob Freeman, 5 Green Building Tax Incentives for 2016, POPLAR NETWORK (Jan. 26,
2016), https://www.poplarnetwork.com/news/5-green-building-tax-incentives-2015 [https://
perma.cc/QJY2-RB9K] (“Financial incentives include long term, low interest rate energy
efficiency financing and grants tied to renewable energy investment.”).
268 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR
RENOVATIONS (V4) 1, https://www.usgbc.org/credits/new-construction/v4/indoor-environme
ntal-quality [https://perma.cc/BH69-7CUR] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (score card can be
downloaded from side menu).
269 Mary Jane Angelo & Joanna Reilly-Brown, Whole-System Agricultural Certification:
Using Lessons Learned from LEED to Build a Resilient Agricultural System to Adapt to
Climate Change, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 689, 745 (2014) (“Strengths of the LEED program
include its flexible credit system, the transparent nature of the standards-setting process, and
the program’s whole-building life-cycle approach to certification.”); About LEED, U.S.
GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/articles/about-leed [https://perma.cc/MPS35SU8] (last updated Oct. 2017) (“LEED credits . . . are developed through several rounds of
public comments and in collaboration with the [USGBC’s] board, broader membership and
staff.”).
270 New Credentialing Organization Launched for Green Building Professionals,
BUILDINGS (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.buildings.com/news/industry-news/articleid/5451/tit
le/new-credentialing-organization-launched-for-green-building-professionals.aspx [https://
perma.cc/U78E-CA5X].
271 See What Is the Green Business Certification Inc. (GBCI), U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL,
https://www.usgbc.org/help/what-green-building-certification-institute-gbci [https://perma.
cc/4275-WAWH] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
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a successful application, it can revoke the certification, subject to the GBCI
Challenge Policy.272
B.

The FTC’s Approach on Privacy and Data Security

The FTC has established itself as the de facto privacy enforcer in the United
States. In other countries, national data protection authorities are formally
empowered by enabling legislation.273 In the United States, however, the FTC
has used its legacy and broad Section 5 authority, designed to address “unfair or
deceptive” trade practices,274 to oversee privacy issues. More recently, the FTC
broadened its use of that authority to oversee data security matters.275 This
authority enables the FTC to address matters where the act or practice at issue
“causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”276 For cases of
deception, the relevant harm can be presumed; for cases of “unfair practices,”
the burden is on the FTC to identify the harmful impact of the relevant
conduct.277
Modern privacy law and policy in the United States emerged from an act of
policy entrepreneurship by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in

272 See generally GREEN BUS. CERTIFICATION, INC., GBCI Certification Challenge Policy,
https://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/GBCI-Cert-Challenge-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8FMP-Z2LF]. It appears that very few, if any, LEED certifications are later revoked under
this policy. See, e.g., Stuart Kaplow, Revocation of LEED Certification, GREEN BUILDING L.
UPDATE (June 2, 2014), http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/2014/06/articles/leed/
revocation-of-leed-certification [https://perma.cc/HXC6-Q523] (“We know with certainty
that GBCI has never revoked a certification, but GBCI does not make public complaints that
initiate the Challenge Policy. It is apparent challenges are infrequent.”).
273 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THIRTY YEARS AFTER: THE OECD
PRIVACY GUIDELINES 26 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49710223.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FRD6-GYLX] (“Nearly all OECD countries have established authorities for
enforcing data protection laws.”).
274 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). Originally, the FTC Act only addressed “unfair
competition.” See Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, sec. 3, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45). In 1938, in the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, Congress expanded
the Commission’s authority to enable it to address “unfair or deceptive acts of practices in
commerce.” Id.
275 See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2015).
276 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
277 J. Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and
Resurrection, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/public-state
ments/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection [https://perma.cc/
3FHD-SQZK] (stating that Commission must analyze each case by balancing costs and
benefits of challenged behavior, which “allows the Commission to provide strong consumer
protection against marketplace abuses without prohibiting related conduct that is beneficial to
consumers”).
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1973. A Department report introduced the concept of Fair Information Practice
Principles (“FIPPs”).278 These principles not only shaped the U.S. Privacy Act,
but also became influential around the world, providing the framework for the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s (“OECD”) 1980
Privacy Guidelines.279 The first and fundamental principle of FIPPs is that
individuals have the right to know what data is gathered about them and how
that data will be used.280 The second principle is that individuals have the right
to consent—or withhold their consent—as to how that data can be used.281 Taken
together, these two principles represent the concept of “notice and choice,”
which the FTC has used as the foundation of modern information privacy policy.
When the FTC took up the challenge of developing a U.S. regime on privacy
protection in the online environment, the concept of “notice and choice” was
followed only in the breach. Notably, in 1998, only two percent of all websites
had privacy policies.282 To spur the industry into action, the FTC encouraged
online companies to post privacy policies that specified what data was collected,
how it was used, and how customers could protect their data (at a minimum, by
choosing whether to use the service).283 Within two years, the number of
websites with posted privacy policies rose from fourteen percent to eighty-eight
percent.284 To be sure, the mere fact that websites adopted policies does not
mean that they were protective or they were necessarily adhered to; but the mere
publication of policies can create liability under the FTC’s Section 5 authority if
companies fail to live up to their promises.

278 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEMS 41-42 (1973), https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M6C2-QQAJ].
279 See generally Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, C(80)58/FINAL (Sept. 23, 1980), http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/
ShowInstrumentView.aspx?%20InstrumentID=114&InstrumentPID=312 [https://perma.cc/
L2XL-7DGS]; Bartosz M. Marcinkowski, Privacy Paradox(es): In Search of a Transatlantic
Data Protection Standard, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1167, 1175-83 (2013) (discussing impact of HEW
report and OECD guidelines).
280 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 278, at 41 (“There must be a
way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is
used.”).
281 Id.
282 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/pri
v-23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V8H-A3GQ].
283 Id. at ii-iii.
284 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10-11 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-ma
rketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7GW-97YG].
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The success of the FTC’s online privacy initiative reflected, among other
factors, the entrepreneurial leadership of its Chairman, Bob Pitofsky.285 Under
Pitofsky, the agency engaged in a sustained campaign to encourage the online
industry to adopt privacy policies, provide guidance on best practice, measure
compliance, encourage advertisers not to work with companies without privacy
policies, and emphasize that legislative action loomed if the industry failed to
act on its own.286 As noted above, once firms put privacy policies in place, the
FTC could enforce them under its Section 5 authority because breaching
promises to consumers constitutes an “unfair or deceptive” act.287
In light of the FTC’s emerging leadership in the field, its authority was
enhanced by three statutory developments in the late 1990s. First, Congress
passed a special law—designed around the notice and choice architecture—to
protect children online, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(“COPPA”), and give the FTC rulemaking authority under that law.288 Second,
Congress passed a law governing financial privacy, the Graham-Leach-Bliley
Act (also built around notice and choice and a data security standard), thereby
granting the FTC, among other agencies, enforcement authority under the law.289
Finally, the Department of Commerce negotiated a role for the FTC to enforce
compliance with the European Union Data Protection Initiative’s safe harbor

285

See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the
Federal Trade Commission on “Self-Regulation and Privacy Online” 4 (July 13, 1999),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statementfederal-trade-commission-self-regulation-and-privacy-online/privacyonlinetestimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UX2P-HYDZ] (describing self-regulation as “least intrusive and most
efficient means to ensure fair information practices online”).
286 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 12-14 (1999), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/self-regulat
ion-privacy-onlinea-federal-trade-commission-report-congress/1999self-regulationreport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V8SE-7AHQ] (“[T]he Commission believes that legislation to address
online privacy is not appropriate at this time.”); Hetcher, supra note 52, at 2047.
287 See Kovacic, supra note 44, at 25 (defining “essential” as “availability of the broad,
flexible policy mandate of Section 5”). The FTC has pursued a similar course with respect to
green marketing claims. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Greenwashing and Self-Declared Seafood
Ecolabels, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 42-48 (2014) (“The FTC published the Green Guides ‘to
enlighten marketers and explain how [the] FTC will enforce section five of [the] FTCA in the
environmental marketing and advertising context.’” (alterations in original)).
288 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012)).
289 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-02, § 503, 113 Stat. 1338, 1439 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(1)(C)) (“[T]he [FTC] shall . . . prescribe . . . such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subtitle with respect to the
financial institutions subject to [its] jurisdiction under section 505.”).
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regime.290 In short, over a period of about five years, the FTC “leveraged its very
limited powers and fragmented authority to hoist itself into the position of being
the dominant regulatory force for data privacy,”291 with Congress responding to
its effectiveness by providing it with additional authorities.
From 2000 to 2010, the FTC’s “privacy jurisprudence [became] the broadest
and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United
States—more so than nearly any privacy statute or common law tort.”292 As
Professors Daniel Solove and Woody Hartzog capture in their study on the topic,
FTC enforcement activity in this area, which is relatively robust, has developed
a series of principles that are carefully followed and implemented by companies
who collect information from consumers.293 To supplement this enforcement
record (and set of principles), the FTC has used its “soft law” capability of
developing best practices through convenings and reports, with practitioners
paying close attention to them as well.294 Finally, the FTC has sought to
supplement its efforts by encouraging complementary self-regulation.295
The FTC’s development of data security standards reflects an even more
ambitious and imaginative use of its authority. Breaking promises with respect
to a firm’s privacy policies constitutes a fairly straightforward deceptive act. By
contrast, when it came to data security matters, the FTC relied on the theory that
a failure to follow reasonable data security practices—say, for example, using

290 MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-EU Data
Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield 5-6 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R44257.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5QV-ANSV].
291 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 605 (2014). Solove and Hartzog praise this effort. Id. at 676. By
contrast, Gus Hurwitz critiques it. See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the
FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955 (2016).
292 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 291, at 587.
293 Id. at 614-22 (noting substantive principles developed by FTC over time and explaining
how lawyers pay careful attention to them to advise their clients); see Kenneth A. Bamberger
& Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 27375 (2011) (examining role of Chief Privacy Officers in evaluating “state-of-the-art privacy
practices,” including FTC actions and guidance, to develop company policies and
procedures).
294 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 293, at 313 (explaining how FTC used “soft-law
techniques” to develop its substantive principles); Solove and Hartzog, supra note 291, at
625-27 (analogizing FTC’s soft law to dicta in judicial opinions).
295 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Success in Self-Regulation:
Strategies to Bring to the Mobile and Global Era 10 (June 24, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/410391/140624bbbself-regulation.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/VH6T-3LLB] (“Over the last decade, the FTC has encouraged the development of
a strong self-regulatory framework in the realm of online behavioral advertising so that
consumers’ potentially sensitive personal information is protected.”).
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insecure open wireless networks (without password protection)—constituted an
“unfair act or practice.”296
In the sole judicial opinion on this topic, the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s
theory on the grounds that a company’s privacy policy that leads a consumer to
believe her data will be safeguarded is misleading and unfair when that company
fails to adhere to reasonable practices to protect her data.297 In particular, the
court analogized the series of data security failings that led to earlier FTC
enforcement actions and the hacking of information from 619,000 consumers
and $10.6 million in fraud to a “supermarket[] leaving so many banana peels all
over the place that 619,000 customers fall.”298 In so doing, the court arguably
ratified the FTC’s effort to place companies on notice that a failure to follow
principles highlighted by past enforcement actions can give rise to liability.299
C.

NIST and Cybersecurity

The Obama Administration’s approach to cybersecurity regulation followed
from its commitment to a multi-stakeholder model of internet regulation.
Originally, the Obama Administration proposed legislation to address
cybersecurity issues, even suggesting model legislative language.300 After
Congress declined to act, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636,
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” on February 12, 2013, which
established that “[i]t is the Policy of the United States to enhance the security
and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber
environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity
while promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil
liberties.”301 In particular, the Executive Order called on NIST for the
development of a voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework, working
“collaboratively with industry to develop the framework, relying on existing

296

In re BJ Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 468 (2005).
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2015).
298 Id. at 247.
299 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 291, at 651-56. This point is arguable because the
court’s opinion can be read more narrowly, see Hurwitz, supra note 291, at 975, and because
ongoing litigation challenges the FTC’s approach in this area. See J. Howard Beales, III &
Timothy J. Muris, Choice of Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 132 (2008) (terming use of unfairness authority in data security cases
“appropriate,” but noting that it is “potentially far-reaching and subject to abuse”); id. (“An
unfairness theory is sound when security deficiencies are clear, have resulted in intentional
breaches that are highly likely to lead to fraudulent use of the information, and low-cost steps
that would significantly reduce the risk are readily apparent.”).
300 FACT SHEET: Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, WHITE HOUSE (May 12, 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/12/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-legislativ
e-proposal [https://perma.cc/V3SF-SHHU].
301 Exec. Order No. 13,636, 3 C.F.R. 217 (2014).
297
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international standards, practices, and procedures that have proven to be
effective.”302
In 2014, NIST introduced its “Framework for Improving Cybersecurity
Infrastructure.”303 The goal of the framework is to use “business drivers to guide
cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the
organization’s risk management processes.”304 The framework focuses on five
core functional categories—identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover—with
guidance in each area on how to manage cybersecurity risk.305 In establishing
the framework, NIST made clear that this framework is not a checklist, but an
evolving set of best practices.306 It has emphasized that the framework is not
“one-size-fits-all,” meaning that it must be adapted by each organization using
it and be utilized with constant vigilance.307 As in the case of the Energy Star
program, Congress—having observed the NIST Framework in practice—later
embraced the model, codifying NIST’s approach in the Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2014 and calling on the GAO to regularly review the
effectiveness of the framework.308
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework won praise both for its process and its
substance. In terms of process, the 2015 GAO report celebrated NIST’s
effectiveness, noting that an overwhelming share of respondents (170 out of 187)
praised NIST’s engagement with industry in developing the framework.309 On

302 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order on Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
realitycheck/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructurecybersecurity-0 [https://perma.cc/48D9-PYZN]; see Doty & Mulligan, supra note 198, at 155
(describing process as “seek[ing] to facilitate collaborative processes that support and raise
the influence of the relevant parties, foster experimentation, and promote accountability to
substantive aims”).
303 See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/doc
uments/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE56-ZKA
B].
304 Id. at 1.
305 Id. at 7-9.
306 See id. at 4 (“[T]he Framework outcomes will scale across borders, acknowledge the
global nature of cybersecurity risks, and evolve with technological advances and business
requirements.”).
307 Id. at 2 (“The Framework is a living document and will continue to be updated and
improved as industry provides feedback on implementation.”); see COMM. ON DEVELOPING A
CYBERSECURITY PRIMER ET AL., supra note 257, at 2 (“[C]ybersecurity is a never-ending
battle, and a permanently decisive solution to the problem will not be found in the foreseeable
future.”).
308 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7421 et seq.).
309 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-152, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: MEASURES NEEDED TO ASSESS AGENCIES’ PROMOTION OF THE CYBERSECURITY
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substance, the framework is gaining followers, with the Gartner Group, for
example, predicting that “[b]y 2020, more than 50% of organizations will use
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, up from the current 30% in 2015.”310 As
for the incentives for adopting the framework, businesses reported a number of
motivations (including business partner requirements (twenty-nine percent) and
federal contract requirements (twenty-eight percent)), but principally cited the
goal of adhering to cybersecurity best practices (seventy percent).311
Commentators also noted that adopting the framework can reduce legal risk,
whether from consumer lawsuits or government enforcement actions.312 By
contrast, other agencies with congressionally provided authority in this area—
HHS, as discussed below313—have struggled to catalyze compliance with
cybersecurity best practices, even when they have more formal authority to do
so.314
In what should drive adoption, the FTC embraced the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework as a valuable guide to sound data security practices. As to its
oversight of specific statutory areas like the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (in
financial services) and the COPPA, as well as in policing “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices,” the FTC has stated that it will take account of whether firms
adopted the framework in determining whether they have acted reasonably.315
In making this point clear, the FTC underscored that the NIST Framework
focuses on process, and that neither the Framework nor the FTC provide any

FRAMEWORK 15 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674300.pdf [https://perma.cc/T94UMP4M]. By contrast, around half (59 out of 112) of those surveyed concluded that the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) was serving an effective role in providing
cybersecurity assistance. Id. at 19-20. The GAO also criticized DHS for its failure to establish
metrics or monitoring programs related to the Framework. Id. at 22.
310 Ted Gary, Tenable Automates NIST Cybersecurity Framework Technical Controls,
TENABLE (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.tenable.com/blog/tenable-automates-nist-cybersecur
ity-framework-technical-controls [https://perma.cc/B2FA-UAWZ].
311 Mark Francis, The Future of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY
PROFS. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-future-of-the-nist-cybersecurityframework/ [https://perma.cc/ZV3M-X42L].
312 Id.
313
See infra notes 321-49 and accompanying text.
314 U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-771, ELECTRONIC HEALTH
INFORMATION: HHS NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY GUIDANCE AND
OVERSIGHT 29 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679260.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXL73LG3].
315 Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Aug. 31, 2016), www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurityframework-ftc [https://perma.cc/GMN3-EDQR] (“Applying the risk management approach
presented in the Framework with a reasonable level of rigor—as companies should do—and
applying the FTC’s Start with Security guidance will raise the cybersecurity bar of the nation
as a whole and lead to more robust protection of consumers’ data.”).

2068

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:2011

hard-and-fast rules; thus, emphasizing that reasonable and responsible data
security practices require constant vigilance.316
Finally, NIST has left open the question of whether it should continue to
superintend the Framework or partner with a multi-stakeholder body to manage
that Framework. In a recent request for information, NIST asked a series of
questions, including how to best manage this initiative.317 For now, NIST
believes it is too early to make any changes, but it is clearly thinking about this
possibility.318 As captured from the request for information responses, it is clear
that if NIST were to make this change, “the desired characteristics of any
potential successor” should be “a neutral non-profit organization with
international reach, respected for technical proficiency, and willing to keep the
Framework free, with participation open to all interested parties.”319 Such a
model of the government’s incubating a successful initiative and spinning it off
is not unprecedented. The FCC, for example, once managed its own equipment
certification program, but now relies on the private sector to do so.320
D.

HHS, Electronic Health Records, and Data Security

The discussion of how the FTC and NIST successfully developed regulatory
initiatives to catalyze better cybersecurity practices provides a useful contrast to
the efforts of HHS to do so. As noted above, the GAO specifically faulted HHS
for its performance in this area.321 Under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)322 and the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”),323 HHS enjoys more
formal regulatory authority than either the FTC or NIST do to ensure data
security and to provide customers access to that data. In particular, the goal of

316

Id. (“[T]he FTC [recognizes] that there is no such thing as perfect security, and that
security is a continuing process of detecting risks and adjusting one’s security program and
defenses. For that reason, the touchstone of the FTC’s approach to data security has been
reasonableness . . . .”).
317 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ANALYSIS OF CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK RFI
RESPONSES 8, 11 (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cyberframework/RFI3_Response_Analysis_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T4Z-J33S].
318 See id. at 2.
319 Francis, supra note 311.
320 Warren G. Lavey, Telecom Globalization and Deregulation Encounter U.S. National
Security and Labor Concerns, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 121, 143-46 (2007).
321 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at 29.
322 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012) (“The Secretary shall establish rules to prevent an entity’s
failure to provide information . . . with respect to previous coverage of an individual from
adversely affecting any subsequent coverage of the individual under another group health plan
or health insurance coverage.”).
323 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1) (2012). Notably, under the HITECH Act, HHS was
authorized to assess penalties based on HIPAA violations due to “willful neglect.” Id.
§ 1320d-5(a)(1)(C).
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the HITECH Act is to drive the use of electronic health records (“EHRs”),
prevent duplicative health care (estimated to cost between $148 billion and $226
billion per year), and facilitate patients’ access to their own health care
information.324 As both the HITECH Act and HIPAA recognize, however,
putting health care information in electronic form raises significant
cybersecurity risks.325
Under HIPAA and the HITECH Act, HHS is authorized to drive better
cybersecurity practices in health care records.326 To date, however, HHS has
failed to do so, with unfortunate consequences. “[M]ore than half the U.S.
population—168.3 million individuals— . . . have had their medical records
breached,”327 reflecting the great value of health data on the black market.328
According to the GAO, HHS is partially responsible for this state of affairs by
failing to provide adequate guidance and failing to enforce HIPAA
effectively.329 As the GAO explained, the HHS’s Security Rule is not clearly
defined, has failed to incorporate relevant NIST guidance, and is poorly
enforced.330 Consequently, the requirements for cybersecurity preparedness in
healthcare are behind other sectors (e.g., financial services).331
In its report, the GAO concluded that HHS has failed to develop a fully
operational and effective auditing program, has not “follow[ed] up to ensure that
agreed-upon corrective actions were taken once investigative cases were
closed,” and has not established benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of its
program, “result[ing] in less assurance that loss or misuse of health information
is being adequately addressed.”332 The GAO identified one case, for example,
where HHS received a complaint of a covered entity using easily guessed
324

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at 5, 7-9.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 222, at 1.
326 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at 1.
327 Joseph Conn, GAO Slams HHS in Health IT Cybersecurity Report, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160926/NEWS/160929925
[https://perma.cc/X9XN-KU7J].
328 Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More to Hackers than
Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/uscybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924 [https://perma.cc/8D7R-Y3C8] (“Stolen
health credentials can go for $10 each, about 10 or 20 times the value of a U.S. credit card
number . . . .”).
329 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at GAO Highlights (“Without
more comprehensive guidance, covered entities may not be adequately protecting electronic
health information from compromise. HHS has established an oversight program for
compliance with privacy and security regulations, but actions did not always fully verify that
the regulations were implemented.”).
330 Id. at 5, 16, 19, 27.
331 Bambauer, supra note 247, at 1050 (“The financial sector is more secure than other
industries and operates under specific cybersecurity mandates embedded in law. This
correlation is no coincidence.”).
332 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 314, at GAO Highlights.
325
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passwords to access health information and responded by sending the offending
company a guidance document. In several other cases, HHS responded to health
information being available on a website by sending a document discussing
appropriate password protections for workstations.333 To fill in the gap of HHS’s
oversight, the FTC has acted in this area, bringing a case against LabMD for
failing to adhere to basic data security practices, sharing sensitive patient
information, and failing to disclose the breach to its patients once it was
discovered.334 LabMD is now appealing the FTC’s action, including on the
ground that health care providers’ data security practices are subject to HHS
oversight.335
HHS is also required (under the HITECH Act) to enable individuals to gain
access to their health care records in electronic form. Here, too, HHS’s efforts
are open to criticism. HHS finally developed such a rule in 2015,336 after the
White House called for “empower[ing] individuals and families to invest in and
manage their health” by giving them access “to the applications and services that
can safely and accurately analyze” their health information.337 The
implementation of this effort is slow going, and, ironically, “some providers may
be unwilling to share this information due to liability concerns with sharing
HIPAA-protected information.”338 Indeed, in some cases, providers actively
block access to this information—despite the statutory requirement to share
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Id. at 24.
See generally Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215
(F.T.C. July 28, 2016), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmd-opinion.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5A2G-B7Y7]; Final Order, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215
(F.T.C. July 28, 2016), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmdorder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S87K-9CF3].
335 Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Application for Stay of Final Order Pending Review By a
United States Court of Appeals at 11, LabMD, Inc, No. 9357, 2016 WL 4923403, at *11
(F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2016), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160830labmdstayapplic
ation.pdf.
336
See generally Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive
Program—Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 through 2017; Final Rule,
80 Fed. Reg. 62,762 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 495).
337 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s
Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative [https://
perma.cc/QL2L-3QD8].
338 CHRIS LAUGHLIN, POLICY SOLUTIONS TO FULFILL THE PROMISE OF THE HEALTH
INFORMATION TRANSFORMATION 6 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2731863 [https://perma.cc/F8VP-B5CX] (paper may be downloaded by selecting
download button at top of screen).
334
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access.339 In other cases, even when they do share this information, they do so
in a cost-prohibitive manner.340
Not only has HHS failed to exercise its core mandates on security and access
effectively, it has also failed to take action in a complementary area, that of
personal health records (“PHRs”). Under HIPAA, HHS oversees electronic
health records (“EHRs”) managed by health care providers.341 But in today’s
world, a range of other providers—from Microsoft to startup app companies—
capture, store, and manage health information that can constitute a personal
health record.342 Indeed, if EHRs were accessible, health care intermediaries
could combine different sources of data (EHRs and PHRs) to support better
health care outcomes. To facilitate such a result, however, HHS (or another
entity) would need to lead an experimental regulatory initiative like those
outlined above, catalyzing patient access to and control over such information
and encouraging better cybersecurity practices. As the GAO noted in a different
report, there is a compelling need to develop a model of “governance and trust
among [health care] entities . . . to facilitate the sharing of information among
all participants in an initiative.”343 To date, however, HHS has not taken any
notable steps to spur such an effort.344 As such, the opportunities to take
advantage of electronic health information (including enabling artificial
intelligence and data analytics to improve health care) remain
underdeveloped.345
As the earned regulatory model advanced in this Article would predict, other
agencies in comparable positions to HHS can and do take action to drive multistakeholder processes to enable sharing of information on a secure basis.
Consider, for example, the case of “Green Button,” a program led by the
Department of Energy and NIST to enable consumers to gain access to their
electric usage information based on the Energy Services Provider Interface

339

HEALTH INFO. TECH. POLICY COMM., REPORT TO CONGRESS: CHALLENGES AND
BARRIERS TO INTEROPERABILITY 12-14 (Dec. 2015), https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/
faca/files/HITPC_Final_ITF_Report_2015-12-16%20v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHU3-RFT
D].
340 Laughlin, supra note 338, at 7.
341 In particular, HIPAA focuses on “covered entities,” which include health plans and
health providers who store and transmit health information in electronic form. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.101-03 (2000).
342 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-817, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS:
NONFEDERAL EFFORTS TO HELP ACHIEVE HEALTH INFORMATION INTEROPERABILITY 7-10
(2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672585.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y93Y-MFKN].
343 Id. at GAO Highlights.
344 For thoughts on how such a model could operate, see generally Laughlin, supra note
338.
345 See, e.g., STANFORD UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, at 26-27
(2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DWU4-B3AG].
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(“ESPI”) data standard developed by the North American Energy Standards
Board (“NAESB”) in early 2012.346 Like in the health care context, such a
standard must ensure customer privacy and security in their energy usage data.
Moreover, to be successful, Green Button must drive adoption among a range of
providers. Over the last several years, it has done so successfully, sponsoring
“Apps for Energy Challenges” and using the agency’s power to convene, all
without any specific legislative direction to undertake this initiative.347
Finally, and consistent with the earned regulatory authority model, Congress
has noticed HHS’s relative failings and has taken actions to address them. In
enacting the 21st Century Cures Act, Congress authorized new institutional
actors to make progress in this area. First, the bill empowers the HHS’s Office
of the Inspector General “to investigate and establish deterrents to information
blocking practices that interfere with appropriate sharing of electronic health
information.”348 Second, it calls for the “[c]onvening [of] existing data sharing
networks to develop a voluntary model framework and common agreement for
the secure exchange of health information across existing networks.”349 In short,
this law shows that where Congress is frustrated by the lack of progress, it can
and does empower alternative institutional actors to step in.
IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF AND APPRECIATION FOR POLICY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The conventional account of regulatory authority is one where Congress
grants authority to agencies based on presumed expertise. By contrast, the reality
of regulatory authority—in a range of contexts, but particularly as to emerging
technologies—is that it can be earned through experimentation and effective
administration. This depends on, as Section I.E explained, entrepreneurial
leadership and a commitment to trial-and-error learning.
Democratic experimentalism, New Governance, and responsive regulation
are powerful theories for conceptualizing the modern administrative state and
how it should operate. Such theories, however, generally assume the presence
of effective leadership and agency capacity for driving and evaluating
experiments that happen organically. What these theories miss is that without

346 The
Green Button, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/data/green-button
[https://perma.cc/N8LH-Q7QD] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
347 Id.; Secretary Chu Launches First-Ever “Apps for Energy” Challenge, DEP’T OF
ENERGY (Mar. 23, 2012), https://energy.gov/articles/secretary-chu-launches-first-ever-appsenergy-challenge [https://perma.cc/BPP2-CU9N].
348 Heather Landi, Senate HELP Committee Passes Health IT Bill, HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/news-item/senate-helpcommittee-passes-health-it-bill [https://perma.cc/U6TC-V62Q].
349 Id.
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the space, incentives, and mandate for such leadership, experimentation will not
necessarily emerge.350
Under the earned regulatory authority model, an entrepreneurial approach to
public policy problem-solving by administrative agencies (or private bodies, for
that matter) is placed front-and-center and is encouraged by a congressional
feedback loop.351 Unlike many theories of the administrative state, this model
does not take the “optimal legal-institutional design . . . as given” or assume “the
expertise of various possible decisionmakers.”352 Rather, it underscores that the
incentive for entrepreneurial leadership in government is that agency leaders and
agencies can maximize their impact by both a willingness to revisit their own
existing legacy and experiment with innovative regulatory strategies. If those
strategies succeed, the agencies (and their leaders) are rewarded with more
formal authority and budgetary support. In this Part, I review the traditional
skepticism of entrepreneurial leadership and explain why it should become a
central part of scholarship around the administrative state.
A.

Traditional Public Choice Theory and Critics of the Administrative State

The Weberian portrait of expert bureaucratic administration and the JamesLandis-New-Deal-era theory of ideal administration faced a withering critique
in the 1960s and 1970s from the public choice theory of regulation.353 Informed

350 Professor Neal Katyal recognized one aspect of this point in Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325
(2006) (“Without bureaucratic overlaps, agencies are not pushed to develop innovative ways
of dealing with problems and may ossify.”).
351 The importance of such an approach is greatly underappreciated in the public law
literature. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2252,
2263-64 (2001) (calling this point “routinely neglected” in legal literature). A number of legal
scholars have recognized the role of policy entrepreneurship, but that concept tends to be
applied to elected officials rather than leaders in regulatory agencies. See, e.g., William W.
Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 54 (2003).
352 Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1422, 1425-26 (2012). An important exception is Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 142,
at 1473 (2014) (discussing criteria for effective agencies and how they can build strong
brands). A different kind of exception is the argument of then-Professor Kagan, who looked
at the challenge from the standpoint of the President and focused on the need to bring energy
and direction to overcome bureaucratic inertia. Kagan, supra note 351, at 2264. Kagan’s
argument is controversial insofar as it rejects the focus on the agency, which is the entity to
which Congress has delegated authority. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “the Decider”?
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (“[W]here
Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline
of judicial review, the President’s role—like that of Congress and the courts—is that of
overseer and not decider.”).
353 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1187
(1975) (criticizing Landis and acknowledging influence of public choice theory); Richard B.
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by public choice theory, Professor Louis Jaffe challenged Professor James
Landis’s defense of the administrative state and concluded that “[o]ne cannot
expect very much from” the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”).354 In so doing,
he overlooked the importance of policy entrepreneurship.
Jaffe’s prediction about the CAB did not foresee the entrepreneurial
leadership of former Chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board Alfred Kahn and the
emergence of a political environment that welcomed reform. In 1977, Kahn took
over the CAB and demonstrated plainly what entrepreneurial leadership looks
like.355 Notably, Kahn championed the benefits of his proposed reform program,
began experimenting with a new model, and effectively built a coalition of those
willing to reform the regulatory regime.356 Kahn’s reform program started from
first principles, examined valuable experiments (in particular, the introduction
of airline competition in California and Texas), and experimented at the federal
level in a manner that hurt the incumbents and invited entry and innovation into
the field.357 Kahn’s leadership was, in short, a demonstration of the limits of
public choice theory.358
Jaffe also invoked the FTC to support his criticisms of the regulatory state.359
That agency provides an instructive case study on the importance of
entrepreneurial leadership. For Jaffe, the FTC was an easy target and a perfect
case study to demonstrate that Landis—who praised the agency—was off the
mark.360 By the early 1970s, former FTC Commissioner Phil Elman deemed the
agency hopeless and concluded that the “best thing to do would be to start all

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1713-15
(1975) (same).
354 Jaffe, supra note 353, at 1196-97. Landis’s defense hinged on the value of expertise.
See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938).
355 Philip J. Weiser, Alfred Kahn as a Case Study of a Political Entrepreneur: An Essay in
Honour of His 90th Birthday, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 603, 605 (noting that Kahn went
against wishes of established firms and pursued deregulatory initiative).
356 Id. at 607-08. Sheingate offers a similar typology, focusing on the need to (1) define
problems and shape the agenda for reform, (2) invest resources in generating new ideas and
institutional strategies, and (3) consolidate innovations into lasting change. Sheingate, supra
note 111, at 188.
357 Weiser, supra note 355, at 606-07 (“[Kahn] sought to undermine the traditional
premises of airline regulation that competition was destructive and should be avoided through
command and control regulation.”).
358 There is a painful irony in this story, as Landis had earlier chaired the CAB and had
failed—on account of public choice pressures—to spur the entry of competition engineered
by Kahn. See DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 153-54
(1980).
359 Jaffe, supra note 353, at 1196 (“The FTC’s uncertain, some-times conflicting, and
heterogeneous jurisdiction made it an easy target for judicial sabotage.”).
360 Id. at 1187 (“It is ironic that two of the agencies so much relied on by Landis, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, were even when he
wrote proving to be ineffective . . . .”).
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over again, abolish the commission and set up a new agency.”361 By the early
1980s, matters got worse, with one Congressman capturing the negative
sentiment toward the agency in calling it “a rogue agency gone insane.”362 Based
on its antipathy to the FTC, Congress passed a special law in 1980 to make it
harder for the agency to adopt regulations, responding to its earlier, overreaching
efforts.363
If one judged Jaffe’s skeptical view of the FTC in the 1970s, one might well
side with his case against the agency.364 Over the last thirty-five years, however,
the agency has emerged as a powerful case study for how entrepreneurial
leadership, flexible experimentation, and capacity-building can pay great
dividends. Following Bob Pitofsky (who led the development of the online
privacy framework discussed above), Professor Tim Muris exhibited similar
entrepreneurial leadership in developing the “Do Not Call List.”365 Through
such leadership, the agency earned valuable credibility and, in Kovacic’s
terminology, built its “brand.”366
A particularly heartening feature of the FTC’s resurgence is that the agency
is no “one-hit wonder.” Over the last thirty-five years, it has developed the sort

361

NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 368 (2004).
William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 590 (1982) (quoting Representative William
Frenzel).
363 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012)); Financial Services and Products: The
Role of the Fed. Trade Commission in Protecting Customers: Hearing on S. 3217 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Timothy J.
Muris) (noting that the law followed criticism that FTC sought to be “the second most
powerful legislature in Washington”).
364 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging
the FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948, 1952 (2015) (“The conventional wisdom—
which is not entirely mistaken—is that the FTC was the governmental equivalent of a leper
colony prior to 1969.”).
365 See The Do Not Call List Authorization: Hearing on H.R. 395 Before the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 12-32 (2003) (testimony of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission); Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition
Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 168, 177 (2005).
366 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 142, at 1472-74. To be sure, once such a culture is
developed, it drives a virtuous cycle. JENNIFER HOWARD-GRENVILLE, STEPHANIE BERTELS &
BROOKE BOREN, WHAT REGULATORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT OUR ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
ii (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4708-howard-grenvillebertelsboren-pprresearchpaper0620 [https://perma.cc/9EGY-2PKJ] (“Cultures that are mindfully managed can
set organizations apart from their peers in their ability to attract and retain talent, and enable
organizational adaptation.”).
362
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of norm around continuous improvement and reflection discussed above.367 It
also has shown a willingness to experiment, adhering to FTC Chairwoman
Maureen Ohlhausen’s maxim that “a leading competition agency like the FTC
must have the courage to fail from time to time.”368 These results are not an
accident, but reflect both culture and leadership that encourages consideration
of alternative ideas.369 As such, the FTC—like the CAB—provides an
instructive case study of how entrepreneurial leadership can transform an
administrative agency.370
B.

The Entrepreneurial Leadership and Agency Capacity Research Agenda

The successes of the CAB and FTC underscore that agencies often enjoy the
opportunity to make a policy impact through experimentation if they are willing
to take risks, develop new experiments, and have the capacity to pull them off.
From Congress’s perspective, it is important that agencies take up this
opportunity because there is a substantial risk that agencies will stick with
traditional models when circumstances change and experimentation is called
for.371 Consequently, when Congress embraces an experiment by specifically
codifying it, it provides important support and momentum, rewarding the
agency’s risk in acting and raising the likelihood that the initiative will continue
to succeed.372

367

See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, How to Measure Success:
Agency Design and the FTC at 100, at 11 (Nov. 6, 2014) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/d
ocuments/public_statements/597191/141106ftcat100fallforum.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2LU2EDA] (“[The FTC’s design] has afforded the agency . . . the capacity and capability to invest
in resolving novel competition issues with long-range plans relying on outreach, research,
advocacy, and enforcement.”); see also Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 142, at 1476 (noting
that “agency’s attainment of greater capability requires acceptance of a norm that encourages
agency personnel to self-critically assess both means and ends”).
368 Ohlhausen, supra note 367, at 11.
369 HEPBURN, supra note 113, at 17 (“If alternative instruments are to be actively
considered and used when they are the best option to deal with a policy issue, there needs to
be a good policy making process in place, supported by information about alternatives
approaches and their advantages and disadvantages.”).
370 For another such example, see generally Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial
Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL.
73 (2007).
371 For Congress, this approach is sensible because it creates incentives for agencies to
invest in developing the necessary expertise to continue improving the relevant regulatory
regimes to accomplish their core mission and purposes. See Matthew C. Stephenson,
Bureaucratic Decision Cost and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469,
470 (2007) (explaining once agency expertise is viewed as endogenous to whether Congress
authorizes agencies to act more broadly, Congress would rationally vest more discretion with
agencies).
372 STEVEN KELMAN, UNLEASHING CHANGE: A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL IN
GOVERNMENT 137 (2005) (“Legislation thus encouraged the front lines to conclude that
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A fundamental challenge to an entrepreneurial vision of regulatory innovation
is that institutional reform does not generally bear immediate results and, to the
extent it does, it builds on prior leadership that invested in institutional capacity.
On the legal and bureaucratic front, it is important that agencies are allowed
some leeway to invest in, and experiment with, institutional reforms.373 On the
cultural front, the challenge is to select agency leaders willing to build the
capacity and mindset to experiment and evaluate different policy solutions over
a time horizon that may well be longer than their term. As former FTC Chairman
Bill Kovacic and Professor David Hyman explain, the incentives are against
making such investments and in favor of bringing big regulatory initiatives or
filing headline-garnering cases.374 Nonetheless, in some cases (like at the FTC),
agencies have developed a tradition of investing in institutional capacity and
innovation.375
For most agency leaders, the challenge of being an entrepreneurial leader and
creating a culture of innovation is a formidable one.376 At its core, bureaucracy
is designed to perform in a consistent and reliable manner. In many cases, new
leaders of administrative agencies are “captured” by the bureaucracy,
encouraged to accept the traditional modes of operation as a given, and
discouraged from exercising entrepreneurial leadership and developing
innovative strategies.377
supporting the reform was safe and that change was ‘for real.’”).
373 From a positive political theory perspective, agencies have room to experiment
because, as a practical matter, Congress is unlikely to act to overrule its decisions. See John
Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 263, 267 (1992) (discussing this point in context of freedom that courts have in
interpreting statutes, noting “range of choices they can make without fear of legislative
reaction”).
374 William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency
Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 296-99 (2016); Muris, supra note 365, at 166
(“An agency head garners great attention by beginning ‘bold’ initiatives and suing big
companies. When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives into successful
regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency heads are often gone from the public
stage. Their successors are left either to trim excessive proposals or even to default, with
possible damage to agency reputation.”).
375 Kovacic & Hyman, supra note 374, at 318-20 (noting that “[a]s the custom continues
and becomes deeply ingrained in the agency’s culture over time, it becomes more difficult
and costly for future leaders to abandon it”).
376 As Professor Daniel Esty explained:
Regulatory excellence thus requires that a regulator’s leadership team encourage fresh
thinking and risk taking at all levels so as to ensure that new approaches will be put
forward, experimentation undertaken, and better ways of doing business identified.
Given the prevailing “CYA” attitude of most government workers (who have decades of
not being rewarded for creativity), innovation will not come easily.
ESTY, supra note 89, at 7.
377 Robert Behn tells the story of how a new Commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue, Ira Jackson, upon his appointment, was asked to accept a range of
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The drive towards predictability is a valuable feature of bureaucracy, as it
ensures that administration of the law is fair and equal. It is, however, a powerful
impediment to experimentation and innovation. After all, powerful political
forces and pressures reinforce bureaucratic inertia, notably because bureaucracy
and rules provide a ready justification for actions, even if they lead to suboptimal
results. At the same time, entrepreneurial leaders—who know how and are
willing to “‘hack’ the system”—can provide guidance, encouragement, and
political cover for risk-taking and experimentation.378
The challenge of hacking the system includes the ability to engage front-line
employees and empower them in efforts directed at experimentation,
reinvention, and performance improvement.379 In a powerful study of
entrepreneurial leadership, Steven Kelman, building off his personal experience
overseeing procurement reform in the 1990s, explains that many agency leaders
fail to even attempt to introduce real change, do not persist in developing new
experiments, or are defeated by the perception (or reality) of bureaucratic and
legal constraints.380 In Kelman’s case, he found that there were a number of
employees ready to challenge the traditional model and test new models (the
“change vanguard,” he called them) and that they were waiting for top-line
leadership to authorize such experiments and engage them.381 In so doing, he
implemented a version of lean startup, putting into practice “some part of a
change quickly, rather than studying the idea to death until perfected, and
mak[ing] corrections along the way.”382 Kelman, in other words, created an
entrepreneurial network within the overall bureaucratic hierarchy.383

operating procedures and to delegate authority to a set of officials. Robert D. Behn,
Management by Groping Along, 7 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 643, 643-44 (1988). Rather
than succumb to this tradition, Jackson resisted such delegations and held long, “exhausting”
interviews with the relevant officials, seeking to understand how and why they operate the
way they do. Id. at 644. When appointed agency leaders accede to the legal culture
(particularly in ways that might run counter to their political charge), that is sometimes called
“going native.” See Michaels, supra note 9, at 247 (defining “going native” as when agency
heads are “co-opted by civil servants”).
378 GEORGETOWN UNIV., supra note 119, at 47 (“Leaders must create the structural
conditions under which new modes of thinking and creative problem solving are cultivated,
encouraged, and rewarded.”).
379 For a discussion of this argument, see Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration:
Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1192 (2016) (“[D]iffering
institutional responses of frontline officers within distinct agencies and subagencies, and the
conflicts they create, can generate fruitful arenas for experimentation and policy
innovation.”).
380 KELMAN, supra note 372, at 7-16.
381 Id. at 39.
382 Id. at 83 (citing Behn, supra note 377).
383 John Kotter developed a framework for how this can happen in his book, Accelerate,
explaining that front-line employees rise to the opportunity because “[t]hey appreciate the
chance to collaborate with a broader array of people than they ever could have worked with
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For successful experiments to stick, and indeed to provide an environment
where agencies can experiment, agencies must develop the capacity to learn
from trial-and-error. For agencies to be proactive, they need to foster a learning
culture. It may well be the relevant culture of the agencies that explain why the
FTC and NIST were able to successfully develop new initiatives—which
Congress embraced after the fact—and why HHS has struggled to implement a
clear mandate. The culture of an agency defines (whether consciously or not)
how it does things, which can involve an adherence to traditional approaches or
an openness to trying new things.384
For leaders to be effective, they must understand and engage effectively with
the culture of their particular agencies. After all, “if they do not become
conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will
manage them.”385 In all cases (and particularly for agencies with an
underdeveloped learning culture), it is crucial that leaders set the right tone and
example, “portray[ing] confidence that active problem solving leads to
learning.”386 Moreover, leaders should be willing to test different “hunches,”
allowing front-line employees to offer ideas, experiment, and develop
innovative strategies, and learn from what works as well as what does not.387
A final related area that has not received the attention it deserves is the
development of regulatory capacity. It is not an accident, for example, that the
environmental leadership in California flows from an agency that has built up
capacity, expertise, and confidence based on successful experimentation.388 As
Professor Ann Carlson explains, the California Air Resources Board is a case
study in regulatory capacity building.389 Similarly, over the last thirty-five years
at the FTC, the effort to build administrative capacity is also an important part

in their regular jobs within the hierarchy.” KOTTER, supra note 91, at 36.
384 For a classic treatment of organizational culture, see EDGAR H. SCHEIN,
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 18 (4th ed. 2010).
385 Id. at 22.
386 Id. at 366.
387 Behn, supra note 377, at 644; see KOTTER, supra note 91, at 97 (noting need for such
leadership to elicit ideas from people taught not to speak up).
388 The importance of regulatory experimentation through entrepreneurial leadership
applies equally to state and local levels. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Privacy
Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 760 (2017)
(discussing impact of state attorneys’ general leadership, using range of tools, in privacy fields
such as mobile apps). The role of experimentation at those levels is justly celebrated, but the
importance of the entrepreneurial mindset and methods that can make experimental regulatory
initiatives successful is generally ignored.
389 See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership:
California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 63 (2012) (“The state is not
simply regulating a single product . . . or a particular sector of the economy . . . . Nor is it
tackling a problem of particular importance to the state . . . . Instead, the effort to regulate
climate change is truly an economy-wide one.”).
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of its successes. But past success is no guarantee of continued effectiveness,
meaning that no agency or initiative can afford to be complacent.390
CONCLUSION
As governmental agencies continue to confront new challenges (including
emerging technologies), it is important to encourage policy innovation and the
evaluation of experiments on how to address issues ranging from the regulation
of drones to how to oversee the sharing economy.391 With respect to emerging
technologies, the pace of technological change and the realities of a global
marketplace will cut against using traditional command-and-control
approaches.392 To have the courage to experiment and embrace alternative
approaches will take entrepreneurial leadership like that displayed by Kahn at
the CAB and Pitofsky and Muris at the FTC.
The traditional administrative law model calls on Congress to enact a clearly
defined, hierarchical regime that empowers a single agency to act, generally by
rulemaking and adjudication. In reality, agencies and private sector bodies are
positioned to experiment using a range of approaches other than rulemaking and
adjudication. When they do so, they develop experience and expertise and build
(or lose) credibility. In some cases, as with the FTC’s oversight of online privacy
and data security, the EPA’s development of the Energy Star program, NIST’s
development of the Cybersecurity Framework, and the MSC’s oversight of
sustainable fishing, these experimental initiatives are successful and provide
Congress with a basis for legislation (or obviate the need for legislation). In all
of these cases, the willingness to experiment, solicit feedback, and adapt is
critical to public policy problem solving.
Going forward, Congress is institutionally well-positioned to encourage and
learn from experiments undertaken by agencies, to recognize where agencies
can adapt to meet new challenges, and to address the situation where they

390

KELMAN, supra note 372, at 213 (observing that 1990s procurement reform efforts
suffered setbacks in 2000s, as “the spirit of frontline empowerment and innovation had
dissipated”).
391 For a discussion of the regulation of drones, see generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot
O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015). For a development of a private
regulatory effort to spur best practice in artificial intelligence, see generally Press Release,
P’ship on AI, Industry Leaders Establish Partnership on AI Best Practices (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.partnershiponai.org/2016/09/industry-leaders-establish-partnership-on-ai-bestpractices/ [https://perma.cc/Q9JW-SNBR].
392 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION
44, 87 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (“[W]hen it comes to regulating the
externalities of transnational production, the state is far from the only game in town, and may
no longer be the most important game in town.”).
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cannot.393 Similarly, scholars should no longer ignore why, in some cases,
initiatives are successful and benefit from entrepreneurial leadership while in
other cases, they flounder. In so doing, they should evaluate whether, when, and
why entrepreneurial leadership emerges to drive experiments and how that
leadership engages with front-line employees and develops agency capacity to
drive results. With the recent institutional turn in administrative law scholarship,
there is an increasing receptivity to such inquiries, suggesting that we may well
be at the dawn of a new era that more seriously considers how agencies operate
in practice than how judges review their actions.394

393

See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 369, 414 (2016) (“[S]cholars and policymakers must be willing to entertain the
prospect of paradigm shifts in both the design of regulatory institutions and the formulation
of regulatory mandates.”); Weiser, supra note 7, at 720 (“[A]n agency’s institutional process
is not a black box; rather it is shaped by a series of practices that can be examined, evaluated,
and potentially changed.”).
394 If this proves to be the case, it will no longer be true that studies of institutional design
are “the Rodney Dangerfield of administrative law: [they] get[] no respect.” Hyman &
Kovacic, supra note 142, at 1516.

